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The thesis construes the cultural field of transitology from the point of view its historical development and 
characteristics. Transitology specifically and transition studies generally mushroomed in the wake of the 
fall of the Soviet Union. Transitology is a specific term for a field of transition studies to which particular 
attributes are controversially connected. These attributes include nomotheticity, ahistoricity, positivism 
and determinism. Of interest is the fact, that transitology represents a field of academia concerned with 
guiding policy recommendations in a process that aimed to democratize and market liberalize post-
socialist countries in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. This instigated a close connection 
between the social scientific debates and actual policy. 
 
The thesis advances in a twofold manner to investigate the effects of the connections and historical 
factors behind the nature and applicability of transitology. First, it constructs a historical narrative of the 
developments of social sciences, transition studies, socialist social sciences and post-socialist space. 
Through different conjunctures each of these levels brought about its own meaning to the manner in 
which transitology consolidated its existence. Secondly, the thesis observes the form and nature of the 
relation of transitological research to its own premises and to its subject matter. A historical and radical 
perspective of social scientific thought is applied to detect the form of the relations. These perspectives 
are mainly world-systems analysis and the political economy of Stephen Gill. The relations under 
observation are then set into a wider context of social sciences and cultural competition with the help of 
Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological thought. Academic labour is perceived analogously to a Marxist 
perspective of labour as a social process. 
 
The thesis concludes transitology to have attained specific character for a variety of reasons. In general 
these reasons are seen to stem from an interaction of the state of social scientifiv thought in the late 80s 
and early 90 and the historical state of the post-socialist space. Observing the effects and developments 
occurring from this interplay, the thesis claims transitological thought to have consolidated itself as a 
constituting cleavage of the post-socialist cultural and political space rather than dissolved into a myriad 
of approaches. 
 
In such a situation, in which a dislodgment between the temporal and spatial dimensions of the cultural 
field of research and academia and the object if its study has occurred, it becomes vehemently important 
to focus on the relation and type of research conducted and its direct and indirect implications to its 
subject matter. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis addresses the research questions, form, intent and direction of studies of 
transition and more specifically transitology. Therefore it does not analyze or describe a 
specific idiographic event or attempt to unfold the outcomes of a concrete historical 
process, but rather concerns itself with a young field of academics consolidating its 
existence. This field, transitology, is establishing itself amidst philosophical cleavages 
of social sciences, structural and historical processes and burdens of scientific culture, 
the shifts in political and social space experienced heavily in the newborn post-socialist 
space and lastly it is establishing itself amidst demanding connections to and needs of 
policy makers and the tumultuous reality of countries in transition. 
The subtitle of this thesis refers to Marx’ 1859 published Kritik. It does so in a few 
regards. Firstly there is a shared focus on the historical perspective, which refuses 
purely formalized and quantified descriptions of market and political relations. 
Secondly it utilizes various social theorists from Immanuel Wallerstein to Pierre 
Bourdieu and Stephen Gill who are all related more or less directly to traditions of 
Marxist thought. Thirdly, this paper assumes the dialectics of academic culture and 
social thought to progress through the instruments which the academic labourer utilizes 
between himself and the subject of his labour. Through these instruments academic 
work becomes a shared and commensurable social process.  Thus knowledge is 
produced in co-operation and with mutual exchange creating a division of labor within 
the academic field, the distinctions. This division deepens and produces the elaborate 
concepts and conducts that further foster academic entrenchments; Labour in the 
academic cultural field is perceived analogously to Marx’ description of labour and its 
division in society.1 Therefore for me a cultural field represents a network of mutually 
responding habitus formed through the social process of cultural production. The 
profession under observation in this thesis is more specifically the academic cultural 
field of social sciences. 
In 2001 political scientist Robert Gilpin wrote that, no one knows exactly what factors 
led to the overthrow of communism and even less is known of new directions2. In 
                                                 
1 Marx, Karl. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Translated from the German by S.W. 
Ryazanskaya, edited by Maurice Dobb. Lawrence & Wishart. London 1971,  introduction. 
2Gilpin Robert: Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton New Jersey 2001, 333. 
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actuality libraries are filled with thousands of varying answers. Therefore it is no 
wonder that such a concept as transition from communism was given room and 
necessity to entrench itself in a distinct manner. I claim in this thesis that the 
contestation of truth in the matter of transition is the most visible evidence of this 
entrenchment. 
But why examine a conceptualization when concepts by definition are under change and 
varying? Besides the habitual explanation of the task of definition indeed being the task 
of science, my own interest with transition lies in its complex origins and connections to 
social sciences and dependencies of social realities. And most importantly my interest 
with transition studies lies in the historical lines of thought which are not just behind all 
these aspects but also permeating them. Transition studies’ and transitology’s innate 
nature is commonly perceived normative and positivist3, but this is only half of the story 
and a mere description. I am interested to know why and how this came to be. For by its 
nature transition as a concept is one to be followed and or to be practiced. It is born out 
of the need to know “what is to be done”4 in analogous manner to social sciences in 
post-Enlightenment Europe, in analogous manner of the 19th century need for social 
engineering. Therefore it stands out as a prime example of the need, articulated by 
Pierre Bourdieu, to ‘objectivate the subject of the objectivation’5 in order to avoid 
relativizations between perspectives. A familiar example of a similar event might clarify 
what I imply: The Methodenstreit (der Nationalökonomie), which was born out of 
political need of the emerging nation-state for a science of fiscal policy, but - once the 
vertical and horizontal boundaries of the emerging field were shaping - this led to an 
epistemological attestation in order to establish legitimization for the functional relation 
of the field of science to actual policy. 
My account in this thesis of the dialectical roots of transitology reflects upon the 
formation of this institutionalization during the 20th century, from Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s empowerment of the individual himself searching for and evaluating 
the relations between the possibilities of his life to Lenin’s insistence on concerted aims 
and action of the society as a whole and to Jeffrey Sachs’s discreditation of the whole 
                                                                                                                                               
 
3Roland, Gerard: The Political Economy of Transition. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
16, No. 1, January 2002, 4. 
4 I am referring here to the works of Chernyshevsky, Lenin and Sachs, all of which will elaborated upon. 
5Bourdieu, Pierre: Science of Science and Reflexivity. Polity Press, Cambridge 2004, 85-88. 
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contestation for the horizon of the possible in favor of one system, one type of 
rationalization. 
The paper will layer by layer historically and theoretically encroach upon the 
conjuncture of thought, action and system that affects decisively the consolidation of 
transitology. In order to do just to such non-observable relations as that between social 
scientific thought and social reality we are to take a step backward in history for each 
two theoretical step towards our objective. 
Perhaps historical social science must start with the abstract and move in the 
direction of the concrete, ending with a coherent interpretation of the processes 
of particular historical systems that accounts plausibly for how they followed a 
particular concrete historical path. The determinate is not the simple but the 
complex, indeed hyper-complex. And of course no concrete situation is more 
complex than the long moments of transition when the simpler constraints 
collapse.6 
 
1.1 Reforms, Economic and Ideological 
Reform is the manifestation of the need to know “what is to be done”. Glancing at 
reform let us first acquaint ourselves with one account from the past. In his introductory 
outlook on the economic and financial reforms conducted in the socialist states of 
Eastern Europe a soviet economist - one B.G Boldyrjow - writes that the People’s 
Democracies have followed radical economic, societal and political transformations and 
entered a period of transition. Boldyrjow wrote the original Russian language version of 
his book in 1951. It was two years later translated to German for the East German 
public under the title Die Finanzen der europäischer Länder der Volksdemokratie. 
Observing the post-World War II transition in Eastern Europe Boldyrjow writes that in 
this transformation finance politics play an important role. He then warns of such 
                                                 
6Wallerstein, Immanuel: Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms. Polity 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1991, 255-256. In this context Wallerstein refers to transition as any 
social transition. 
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international actors as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as mere 
affiliates of Wall Street's interests. 7 
Boldyrjow reflects upon the financial and currency reforms implemented after the last 
war as cautionary examples. According to him those reforms in effect led to a drop in 
the quality of life, raised the tax burden, raised the prices of mass produce and sank real 
wages. The final result was a chronically disrupted condition of the finance system. The 
word ‘chronically’ appears for Boldyrjow to imply fundamental structural errors in 
economic policy.  
The financial restructurings of the time, according to Boldyrjow, were “diametrically 
opposed” to the previously implemented post-World War I reforms. The reforms aimed 
to consolidate and develop the economies, raise the material prosperity of the people, 
end inflation and stabilize the currencies. The reforms were implemented “abnormally 
rapidly”. The actions have abolished household deficits and secured the growth of 
currency reserves and increased goods turnover as the empirical data presented by the 
author reveals. The new policies thus would appear to have remedied actions led by a 
previous regime with a fundamentally flawed understanding of economics. 8 
In regards the importance of successful fiscal policy in the implementation of economic 
reforms Boldyrjow then quotes none other than Lenin: 
One must not forget that all radical reforms of our times have led to failures, 
when we have not been successful with finance politics.9 
In the manners described above, the reforms adopted led according to Boldyrjow to a 
transition from capitalism to socialism and to the consolidation of the proletarian 
dictatorship, Boldyrjow writes.10 
The post-World War I economic reforms which B.G. Boldyrjow compared the soviet led 
ones after the Second World War and mentioned as ‘diametrically opposed’ were mainly 
American led. Of interest here is that goal-oriented economic reforms are not 
unprecedented, on the contrary, but the means and form of reforms are bound in various 
ways, historically, normatively and instrumentally. As you may have noticed 
                                                 
7B.G. Boldyrjow 1953. introduction and chapter 1 .Terms were translated from  the German by the author. 
The German word used for transition in the copy is Übergang. 
8 Boldyrjow 1953. introduction and chapter 1. 
9Boldyrjow 1953, 7. Translation from the Russian. Quotation translated from  the German by the author. 
10 Boldyrjow 1953. introduction and chapter 1. 
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Boldyrjow’s argumentation does not conceptually differ much from what we might have 
heard from modern economists in the 90s, besides that they would be quoting Jeffrey 
Sachs instead of Lenin. 
An odd 40 years later in 1989-91 the historically short lived political experiment of 
Bolshevism came to an abrupt, sudden and swift end. Yet, the decades of state socialism 
exerted huge impact on continuities on multiple levels from social habitus to philosophy 
of social sciences. At the same time the Yang was left without the Ying as the dialectical 
structures of bipolar international politics and societal theory crumbled. And as the 
French sociologist and theorist of cultural competition and distinction Pierre Bourdieu 
describes, the strongest orthodoxies come usually not in one but two varieties.  
This revolution was one from above11. It was a refolution, as termed by Timothy Garton 
Ash, a sequence of reforms from above in reply to the pressure from below. Such key 
figures as Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev opted out of one ideology and 
continued politics in reformist movements12. And as a refolution, one abandoning 
ideology, the vacuum of power following the turn of events was not one of a political 
but of an ideological sort. It was one quickly seized13 by an eclipsing tradition of 
western thought as the post-modern challenge made space for neo-modernisation 
theories to establish a foothold in the newly deserted cultural field of academics in post-
socialist space14.  
This ideological dislodgment following the 1989-91 revolutions can also be interpreted 
from the relative peacefulness of the events themselves in relation to the heavily 
normative debate on the direction and nature of the reforms to be undertaken, which 
began already during the very same years. In 1990 Ralf Dahrendorf attacked the Third 
Way argument15 and already in 1990, with Yeltsin and Gorbachev still battling it out, the 
Economist published the famed article by Jeffrey Sachs titled What Is to Be Done? 
Furthermore, following the Frenchman Alain Touraine’s sociology of social 
                                                 
11Dahrendorf, Ralf: Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. Chatto & Windus, London 1990, 56. 
12Dunlop, John:The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Pinceton University Press, New 
Yersey 1993, 22-23. 
13Gowan, Peter: Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe,  New Left Review, Vol. A, 1995, 3-60. 
14Wagner, Peter: A history and theory of social sciences. Sage Publications, London 2001a, 161-166. 
15The Third Way argument in this context spoke for the preservation of certain socialist policies together 
with the implementation of selected capitalist and democratic policies. 
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movements16, had there existed a shared goal among the opposition movements of 
1989-91 other than the simple desire for reforms or willingness to overthrow the 
communists, divisions and political persecution on a cadre level would have likely 
followed. In such a case groupings would have followed a shared symbolic utopia, one 
which would have been seen as promising benefits for them in relation to the synthetic 
others, pinning societal classes against each other. Such divisions of the political cadres 
did not occur. No antisystemic movement stemmed from challenging the delegitimized 
communists as their defining systemic ‘other’, rather movements built upon parallel 
lines of legitimization were experienced. These movements challenged communist rule 
in a wider or narrower context then that of the communist system of legitimization. The 
upholding and legitimizing structures of the communist system were buried rather than 
harnessed by an antisystemic movement.  The main events thus centered on elite 
competition as proposed by transition studies17 such as the August putsch and several 
less dramatic renegotiations of state power or wider social movements as was witnessed 
in the Baltic states for example. As put by John Dunlop among others, the legitimizing 
ideology was buried18. 
Why is it important that this revolution buried an ideology and not the bodies of the 
cadres? It is important for what followed; an already fading school of thought seized its 
opportunity and moved in to the abandoned grazing grounds. As a naïve analogy would 
serve the manner in which the common cold prospered among the non-immune Native 
Americans. A demand for slogans and ideas was apparent in the emerging post-socialist 
cultural field. For the world divided by the October Revolution, in which the conflict of 
politics was that of revolution and counter-revolution, had ceased to have much relation 
to reality already before 1989 ended the ideological contestation19. And thus ideas and 
reality were dislodged from each other dramatically, allotting an easy “hostile 
takeover”. 
Awestruck and dazzled by the swift fall of its constituting other the western social 
sciences nevertheless had to accept that not time nor society seized but rather took form 
                                                 
16Touraine, Alan :The Voice& the Eye, An analysis of social movements. Press Syndicate of the University 
of Cambridge, Cambridge 1981. 
17 Gans-Morse, Jordan: Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist 
Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm. Post-Soviet Affairs, 2004, 20, 4, 320-349. 
18 Dunlop 1993 
19 Hobsbawm, E.J.:Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge 1992, 177-192. 
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in a completely new social and political space underlined by a new dynamics of a 
socialist legacy and capitalist ambitions. And therefore, as there were now no more 
barbarians in the north, no more a by default opposing ideology, the remaining 
hegemony had to construct its own Hadrian’s Wall for its cadres, the cornerstone of 
which would be named the transition. A dominant ideology was replaced by another20, 
by one torn by inner conflicts21. In this manner many of the problems facing the post-
socialist states resembled both the semi-peripheral problems faced by them in 
procommunist times22 as well as  the post-World-War II problems described by B.G. 
Boldyrjow, both in policy theorizing and in reality.  
The destructiveness of this development was emphasized by the fact that also the 
meritocratic middle class23 in post-socialist countries was previously upheld by the 
ideology. Following for example Samuel Huntington, the capacity to stable rule rests on 
systems of accountability24. If middle class status loses its accountability the economic 
repercussions are felt throughout the society and even more emphasized when we look 
at how the diffusion of the post-socialist countries to the world-economy set them into 
its semi-periphery25. Destructive in itself, this situation was worsened by the collapse of 
the regional trading system26 at a time of the so called second regionalism27, which 
meant the rise of strengthened regional control of markets and boarders within the 
neighboring European Union. Thus, this diffusion took place in situation of stronger 
regional competition allowing for fewer geopolitical pressure vents that would have 
counteracted the new constraints imposed by the exposure to a liberal market system. 
                                                 
20Hann, C.M. ed.: Postsocialism. Ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia. Routledge, London 2002, 
preface. 
21Wallerstein 1991. 
22Derluguian Georgi: Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in The Caucasus. The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 2005, 79. 
23In many regards it can be argued that there was no middle class in real socialism. Yet I claim that clear 
upward mobility was experienced at least following its establishment and many positions consolidated 
in this process were entrenched after the Kruchev period, therefore strictly when referring to social 
mobility and meritocracy in relation the western or core countries I wish to envoke the concept. 
24Haggard, Stephan – Kaufman, Robert: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey 1995, 370. 
25Boatca, Manuela. Semiperipheries in the World-System: Reflecting Eastern European and Latin 
American Experiences. Journal of World-Systems Research, XII, 2006 and Fischer, Stanley: IMF Essays 
from a Time of Crisis. The International Financial System, Stabilization, and Development. The MIT 
Press. Cambridge Massachusetts 2004, 429. 
26Haggard - Kaufman 1995, 372. 
27Gilpin 2001, 341. 
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 With this I mean, that as will be argued in this thesis, the defining cleavages for cultural 
and political competition became more so the discrepancies between systems of thought 
and historical realities rather than existing cleavages of the shared post-socialist space. 
Therefore it is unsurprising that some have likened the end of communism to the end of 
a civil war between two children of the European Enlightenment28. And returning to the 
establisment of this civil war it is descriptive that it was an educated yet disillusioned 
Frenchman on the cold wintery streets of Kazan who should shout out these words in 
Gorky’s 1923 novel My Universities: 
Progress–people made it up, to fool themselves!29 
Just as Marx scorned the likes of Proudhon and Owens30, Gorky has the disillusioned 
child of enlightenment renounce the naïve belief in progress for the sake of concerted 
struggle to control the possible horizons of it. Here I stumble upon the dialectical 
analogy between the rise and fall of communism, which farther ahead I will explore 
further in relation to the creation of transitology, the science of post-socialist transition. 
 
1.2 Construct 
The actual construct of my thesis is as follows. First observations of transition studies 
will be conducted to introduce the field and my perspective of it. Some argumentative 
points will already be included to draw connections to the theoretical material and to 
sort out the material in a relevant manner. These points will fall into context with the 
subsequent chapters. The focus is set on politics and economy with a selection of 
varying perspectives representing authors of different fields, origins and perspectives. I 
will then embark on presenting my analytical tools with the help of a specific example 
from transition literature, what I call the Stiglitz debate, thus also taking first steps at 
constructing the analysis. This will be followed in chapter 4 with a historical look at the 
events leading to the birth of a new field of science, transitology, and lastly its relation 
to the post-soviet social space. Chapter 5 then tackles the actual character of the cultural 
                                                 
28Ackerman Bruce: The Future of Liberal Revolution in Tismaneanu, Vladimir ed.: Revolutions of 1989. 
Rewriting Histories. Routledge, London and New York 1999, 210. 
29Gorky, Maxim:. My Universities. Foreign Languages Publishing, Moscow.1952. Translated from the 
Russian by Helen Altschuler. First published in 1923. 
30 Dahrendorf 1990, 41. 
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field and its roots. Having in this way constructed my view of transitology, I assert my 
analysis upon it in chapter 6. 
I cover the relation of transitology to policy and social space, its relation as a field of 
science to my analytical tools and its relation to the philosophy of social science. In 
following this construct please refer to figure 1 as simple illustrative help. We may 
visualize the field of transitology to move in time. Its boundaries are ‘horizontally’ 
formed and changed in relation to other cultural fields and indigenous and exogenous 
cultural and scientific distinction. ‘Vertically’ it is constituted by action stemming from 
transitology, such as policies and reactions to them, and through historical 
epistemological debates of social scientific inquiry. 
Figure 1. 
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Having thus construed an image or mould of transitology as a cultural field I lastly 
move on to synthesis and conclusions of how it came to be. In line with a historical 
perspective I will argue that the character of transitology was not the result of a 
contingent event or teleological or evolutionary development, but a structural cleavage 
in itself, one augmented by developments of different systems of thought manifesting 
themselves differently on various levels of societal action and thought.  
The incorporation of the debate on a concept to the concept itself becomes evident in 
this process. For a conceptualization of anything is bound to time and to usage, since a 
concept itself, in its historical meaning, is opposed to anything universal. It is a 
framework for distinguishing and discriminating between actions of similar sort31. A 
concept is bound jointly and individually by its users and usage. It is an instrument.  
In construing transitology the construct of the research gains additional importance. I 
intend to carve out a meaning for transitology as a historically bound phenomenon, a 
product as well as a conceptualizer of its time. My analytical tools are themselves 
positioned in a manner or another within the scientific field(s) and the synthesis of these 
positions will define the value and effect of my arguments. Thus emphasis should lay on 
their interplay. I formulate a division of labor between the theoretical approaches 
applied, with the hope that this division will produce extra value as system of analysis. 
By the means of reflections and reference to world-systems analysis and radical political 
economy I hope to discern some effective components of the historical and contested 
transition phenomenon with a focus on the aforementioned distinctions of the concept. 
In this manner these approaches will function as social scientific tuning forks rather 
than actual determinants of deductions. Tuned on the frequency of my propositions they 
may detect points of interest, but as they are approaches to social theory themselves I 
cannot apply them directly when observing social theory. My own epistemological 
perspective of social sciences is that “since human beings, their culture, and their social 
institutions are nowhere the same and are constantly changing, they can only be 
understood through history and historical knowledge”32. 
                                                 
31Inglis, Fred: Culture. Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden 2004. 
32 Best, Steven: The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, Habermas. The Guilford Press, New 
York 1995, preface XIV.  
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I would like to remind, following historian, sociologist and world-systems analyst 
Georgi Derluguian33 and many others, that in social science we may only discuss or 
notice phenomena and only to the extent that our conceptualizations and theoretizations 
allow us. Thus, many a phenomenon or connection will be excluded. Therefore, when 
evaluating an approach taken on transition, for example by economics, I am necessarily 
contesting its epistemological premises. And in that regard this thesis sides with 
historical, structural and critical social science, which it also presents as the opposing 
side of the dialectics within social sciences in a larger sense, of the dialectics that 
affected the contingent independent variables creating the dependent form of 
transitology. Precisely for this reason I would like to stress the analytical and 
instrumental value of my own theoretizations or simply problematizations, as they shed 
light on the nature of the perspectives under comparison from their specific viewpoint. 
In this I recognize that any theorem necessarily also affects in return both my 
perspective and consequent choices, causing some inevitable path-dependencies for the 
research, which should indeed and importantly be read into the research itself to grasp 
the relation between these perspectives and their object of study. 
On the same note one could easily be advised to center a study of the academics of 
transition around empirical data sets as a primary source material, even if they too were 
and are gathered from the point of view of particular epistemological dispositions and 
often but reinforce those dispositions. I speak here of statistical data and policy reports 
by organizations connected to policy formulations. In the case of transition such 
organizations have been for example the IMF, World Bank, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and Freedom House. An approach focusing on such 
source material becomes common logic in a situation in which the real choice is actually 
between different normative approaches to policy, as was kindly reminded to me to be 
the condition in transition34. But I assert that the relation between an analysis and the 
policy it suggests is in actuality therefore often disregarded on grounds of necessity, in a 
similar fashion as is often done in the act of objectivating the initial target, space and 
time of a study. The relations of a study or a field of science to its concrete and abstract 
surroundings can be as determining as the results and inner logic of the study itself. The 
existence or life of a study or a field of science within socially bound time and space is 
                                                 
33Derluguian 2005. 
34Researcher Pekka Sutela to Juho Korhonen. Email exchange 10th of April 2011. 
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often disregarded when focus is laid on the spatial and temporal characters of the object 
of study. 
On one hand, when drifting too far into epistemology, any scholar’s inability to avoid 
eclecticism is to be set under close scrutiny, simply due to unavoidable humane 
shortcomings. On the other hand, the choice of an analysis for social conditions is 
necessarily an act of eclecticism in itself, an act from which also the analysis under 
observation in this thesis stems from, the formation of transitology was a choice of an 
analysis for social conditions. And importantly, it is as such also an act towards social 
conditions in a similar fashion as the means and form of social reform always are, 
whereas the goals not necessarily are. 
Following the epistemology of my perspective the analytical position of the research at 
hand is stemming from world-systems analysis. In regards the 1989 upheavals it was 
outlined by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi in the article 1989: The 
continuation of 68 and eloquently and exemplary further described by Derluguian in 
Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. In short it assumes no plausible dissections 
between time and space, thus no dissections between the social, political and 
economical spheres either. Therefore, it concerns itself with recognizable structural fault 
lines affecting historical processes. 1968 was a ‘world revolution’ of antisystemic forces 
against the Old Left and the capitalist world-system, a cleavage between two layers of 
history; a reorganization of the industrial and technological and the social and 
institutional. 1968 therefore represents symbolically a longer term process. Reactions of 
prosystemic forces to this cleavage varied. In Brezhnev’s USSR repression and a 
‘sweeping under the carpet of ideological self-assurance’ were the methods employed to 
counter the contradictions of 1968. Thus the cleavage between the productive and 
institutional apparatuses was not mended; the problemacy of 1968 was not incorporated 
into the systemic forces to a similar degree as happened in Western Europe or China 
through a quantification of the antisystemic demands into the political topos.35 How this 
process came to be and then manifested itself is discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
No doubt other fault lines to the past can be drawn as well. Though In transition studies 
fault lines from the past are rarely drawn and even though no discipline goes as far as to 
deny the historicity of transition dynamics and processes and their inner contradictions, 
                                                 
35 Arrighi, Giovanni – Hopkins, Terence – Wallerstein, Immanuel: 1989: The Continuation of 1968. in 
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they are more often than not swept aside in conjunction with emphasizing a clean sleet 
strategy. This is exemplified in the early rejection of the Third Way Model, which would 
have built upon socialist legacy rather than attempt a transformation36. As this rejection 
comes to reflect a major conjuncture in this thesis I find it worthy to quote Dahrendorf 
lengthy on the topic here: 
It [Third Way] has somewhat awkward names, all of which aim at describing a 
halfway house between the realities of what used to be the West and what used to 
be the East. Some speak of a ‘middle way’, some of a ‘third way’, and all believe 
it would be wrong to shed the achievements of forty years of socialism and 
swallow capitalism lock, stock and barrel… This sounds good, even plausible, 
yet it is the wrong way to approach the tasks which lie ahead both in theory and 
in practice.37 
Defined by Robert Gilpin as the interaction of markets, states, multinational 
corporations and international organizations38 global political economy is a 
superordinate concept of the approaches both of Immanuel Wallerstein and of Stephen 
Gill. Gill's analysis of political economy is the second position to which reflections 
from transitology are drawn in my historical conceptualization. Both, in their separate 
regards, insist upon no division of the unit of analysis, the global social order. In order 
to dissect various perspectives of transition such a scale of analysis is required. Also 
historical developments within social sciences advocate this type of an approach. Ever 
since the end of the 80s the dichotomy of the underdeveloped versus the developed has 
been losing ground to the rise of the market versus state problematization39. This 
development manifests itself in forms of policy legitimization, incentives for action and 
in a shift of normativeness from ends to means. What I perceive this shift to be is further 
elaborated in chapter 5. The question of policy legitimization is raised in my analysis in 
chapter 6 as the focal point of the effects of transitology on the political field of the 
post-socialist space, or more precisely the political topos, which refers to the historical 
habitus of the political actors. 
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Therefore the political economy of transition is historically bound, a view often rejected 
by economists. As when looking at other transition societies besides the post-communist 
countries, the relative strength of power holders favored by the old economic models 
also represents a force for continuity40, but as discussed above, in the case of post-
socialist transitions the old macroeconomic models were bound to the almost 
categorically rejected ideology.  
 
1.3 Backdrop 
Let us briefly consider the situation in which we find ourselves examining transitology. 
Transition studies have historical roots and existed already before the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Abraham Lowenthal, in his foreword to the 1986 groundbreaking four volume 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead, suggest that the importance of the study is in ”Its analytic and 
normative focus on the prospects of building democratic or polyarchic politics... useful 
not only to scholars and observers but to political actors alike.”41 I assert that in the 
wake of the events unfolding in 1989 transitology then consolidated its specific 
character. 
Normative and prescriptive ideas shadow almost all discussions of states and 
economic transition.42 
The need for policy legitimization and measurability stimulated the growth of 
transitology, it began to take shape as a field of its own, borrowing mainly from political 
science and economics. Such values as democracy, liberalization and privatization were 
given quantitative standards through the statistics of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and Freedom House. The former began to publish its 
Transition Report in 1994 and the latter its Nations in Transit publication in 1995. 
Different hypothesis on building democracy could thus be tested and contested, 
undermined, critisized and built upon. Specific areas of transition were recognized and 
theories of them simplified and again complexified. Individual choice or structural 
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dependency were stressed or synthesized. The transitional political space was created 
and defined to meet the needs of theories applied. It was created to be unique, ever-
flowing, interdependent and novel. Even though structural legacies may restrict or direct 
possible conflicts arising from the transitional space, the space itself is artificially 
treated as isolated by the 1989/91 divide from the rest of the social sciences and history. 
How did this come to be? A brief narrative of the basis of the initial conditions my 
research assumes can clarify how transitology grew out of social sciences themselves. I 
later on offer as one explanatory factor for that process the epistemological down curve 
of utopian thought within social sciences at the time. 
In constructing a narrative I attempt to tell the story of how the scientific fields of 
political science and economics, fostered in Europe and proliferated in North America 
moved in and occupied the turbulent Eurasian cultural field. I will first touch upon the 
issue now and elaborate it in conjunction with each respective perspective of the 
cultural field of transitology. 
Political science and economics within the social sciences have traditionally advanced 
themselves to depict and analyze  minute shifts and layered dynamics of the 
industrialized, modernized core states and their - in a relative sense no doubt - 
structurally very static political systems. Within these political and economic systems of 
the core states the structures of the political arena have been, for the life span of 
political science and economics as social sciences know them now, horizontally 
consolidated and established not only in respective states, but also within the world-
economy. Thus, many an analysis has found its constants self-explanatory and have 
concentrated on specific variables and often so within single equations. I argue in line 
with Steven Best that these types of explanatory models distort any description of 
societal dynamics43. 
As we are able to read from even the relatively short yet tumultuous history of the post-
socialist Eurasian space, the aforementioned consolidation of the economic and political 
systems is not the prevalent condition in its social and political space. Therefore I wish 
to determine in which form the detailed approach of western political science and 
economics has come to connect to that social and political space. What is the form and 
character of their relation and which dynamics sustain it? 
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Reflections to existing divisions and niches within the social sciences, to approaches 
which by default assume a more structural and constant based – in opposition to variant 
– research scheme, shall be drawn. Mainly that is to radical political economy, which 
assumes the flip-side of the composed condition in core polities to naturally be a 
discursive and radically more strongly stratified and cleaved structure of social 
dynamics. Secondly reflections will be drawn to world-systems approach which has its 
origins in criticism of the 20th century modernist and developmentalist social science, 
wishing to disclaim the subject matter of the Methodenstreit in favor of not delineating 
the explanandum from the explanans through out-of-necessity interdependent kantian 
categories, such as space, time and causality, but rather attempting to reach synthesis. 
Therefore we might in this manner arrive at a definition and analysis of the horizontal 
dynamics of transitology within the cultural fields of sciences and at a narrative style 
description of the vertical connections and linkages of the cultural field to existing 
polities and on the other hand to the social sciences and the dynamics, cleavages and 
entrenchments within them. 
Thus, partially I attempt to fulfill Bourdieu's ideal of reflexivity of science and in - only 
epistemological – opposition and partly through the critical matter of the world-systems 
analysis, to Hempel and Oppenheim's deductive-nomological model44 and actually put 
forward the ‘what’ question towarded at the ‘why’ question itself in the context of this 
particular field and process within the social sciences and arrive at a both historical and 
hermeneutic conclusion. 
Therefore any assumptions of the horizontal dynamics of transitology rely and rest on a 
bourdieunian description of cultural fields examined through reflections on the 
aforementioned approaches, divergent from transitology within the social sciences 
themselves. Whereas the processes that gave form, consolidated and connected 
transitology to its subject matter on the other hand and social sciences philosophy on the 
other, are described historically and in narrative with two main focuses. These focuses 
are the philosophy of social utopias and the dynamic of nomothetic versus idiographic, 
modernism versus dependency, the ever occurring manifestations of the Methodenstreit. 
From these systemic structures and their histories I will pinpoint the conjuncture that is 
transitology. 
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Why look at such a normative scientific field from such a theoretical and abstract point 
of view? Because there is a linkage: 
Of course each of these normative-prescriptive positions rests on non-normative 
theories concerning the likely causes and consequences of state action in its 
various guises. But each causal account also clings to a set of preferences.45 
Dismaying this linkage may lead to tautologies, path-dependencies and reifications. 
 
1.4 A System 
The idea of a system bears indirect weight in my analysis and therefore calls for closer 
inspection. In constructing my analytical framework with which I approach transitology 
I am by necessity presenting a system of thought. The importance of a system is further 
emphasized when diving deeper into the roots of thought behind the initial conditions 
around the consolidation of transitology. Social sciences as well as the historical 
ideological system(s) that saw their decline are heavily conditioned by forms of 
systemic thought, as goes the argument of Ralf Dahrendorf46. 
The definition of a system becomes increasingly complex when moving in a dissection 
of time and space of a cultural field, historical social space and also different 
philosophic traditions. My main goal is to remain in line with the underlining premises 
of this work; a historical perspective sensitive and disapproving of the entrenched 
cleavages of social sciences with an eye on both utopian thought and cultural 
competition. The following then becomes by necessity the definition of a social 
historical system. The aim is to provide an outline of the functioning of such a system, 
when referring to systems in the framework of this thesis. 
In my perspective of a system I have used as broad guidelines seven requirements set 
down by Christopher Lloyd for a materialist, structural and historical theory of social 
change. Main points of interest in Lloyd’s requirements are the coherence of a realist 
model of social structure, commitment to real non-observable systems of social rules, 
theoretization of general structural processes and transformations and a theoretization of 
the relationship of the social enquirer to social realities and of phenomena to structures 
                                                 
45Tilly 2001, 403. 
46 Dahrendorf 1990, 37-71. 
19 
 
as well as specification of the non-observable layers relation to observable evidence.47 
The same definition should then be applicable to different layers of social relations from 
action to policy and cultural competition to philosophical thought. Most importantly my 
definition and its use should not inherently exclude any temporal continuity. 
A system by its premises defines its borders. These borders are not static, and therefore 
are not actors in relation to their contents, because the contents have defined them. 
Following the same logic structures are by definition real as they constitute the 
“borders” of the system 
A structure is a set of relations, for a system is built upon relations. One must avoid the 
trap of imagining singular objects bound by relations. These structures of relations are 
non-observable since, they take effect in correlation to and under the molding sway of 
the existing matter of the system, which in itself has time and space only through the 
regulating force of the structures. Structures cause change. The notion of structural 
change is axiomatic.  
The possible variants of thought, mentality and ideas are defined by the location of the 
thinker(s) in the non-limited society or system which they also mould. And as you may 
already guess, by location we do not merely mean physical presence, but, to take an 
example, the internet amongst many things is in itself a location and also has many 
locations. 
Underlining the word general and its vagueness we may derive three general guide 
lining theorems of processes. First, we have that of a chain reaction. Whence, the 
relational field of a system becomes fixed in position that allows the spread of certain 
type of a changing force, we may experience a chain reaction that either acts to confirm 
or to transform the relations. The reason that allows such a chain reaction is commonly 
either a static state of affairs or a rapidly changing one, both of which may lead to non-
transformative and transformative change. Second, we have a clash, the clash of two or 
more types of relational structures that occurs faster (even too fast to grasp) or slower 
(even too slow to realize) and for reasons as various as relations in the system itself 
intensify their interaction. This may happen in a geologically, materially and temporally 
confined manner and on the level of thoughts and ideas on any imaginable level of their 
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relations, such as culture or technology. The effect is an adaptation, a synthesis of the 
clashing relations, never the wiping out of any “participating” relation network. Third, 
the counterpart of a clash is a bifurcation of interacting systems; again a complete 
bifurcation is naturally never achieved. This may lead to intensified changes or statism 
(also statism is never complete) or neither in the respective systems. 
Social phenomena defining the structures should always be seen horizontally and 
vertically. Horizontally in the sense of the interaction they have had and can have on 
other social phenomena and vertically by extending our scope a level above and below 
the most obvious layer at hand. The defining character of the structures should always 
be taken into consideration together with their coerciveness and discursiveness towards 
future. This does not mean apparent norms or lines of action but the perceived outcomes 
to follow from the interaction of the phenomena and the structures.  
The non-observable layers are in fact not non-observable, but social change in itself. In 
the systems’ (and in our) concepts of the future lie the possibilities for change, 
transformative, non-transformative or conforming, and in different manners.  
These are the structures, for only they define possible and eventual action. Therefore the 
traditional weakness of a holist approach - criticized by Lloyd48 as well - is actually 
only a weakness of those who see the present from the viewpoint of the future, which is 
pure impossibility in a self-constituting system. They take an imagined leap into the 
perceived future constrained by their scope of possibilities and then begin to explain. 
They thus treat the present as they have the past, dogmatically and universally. Inherent 
here is a telos of which holism is then blamed for, when holism in fact becomes a 
prerequisite, for also the observer constitutes the system. This is an inherent problem in 
any purely deductive-nomological model. 
An important conclusion is one related to the actions of the observer of the system. 
Whenever we make observations of a system, through these observations we transform 
its and our scope of possible action. Transitologists have widely engaged in this with 
minimal focus on the form of their observations or the transformations they bring about. 
And even though some claim to theorize universal laws or predict possible outcomes, in 
fact they merely put forth a wish, knowingly or unknowingly, that things would end up 
that way.  The action of a historian “only” studying the past is in fact a non-action 
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molding the future. Change is not the opposite of constant or the opposite of non-
change. Change is default in a system that is governed and created by relations. Such is 
also the only conceivable system, when the laws of the system are in fact results of its 
structure and vice versa. Hume was wrong to assume that causality could not be proved, 
in fact causality is the basis of existence, but agency cannot be proved. The agent needs 
to become an object to be an agent; the social scientist must objectivate the process of 
academic labour. 
Politically the major consequence of a system here is the navigational force of a 
dominant regime which is confirmed and conformed to by non-transformative 
resistance. Transformative change is then active shaping of the structures (that are the 
past, as the moment is constantly reproduced by the past) to widen the scope of 
possibilities for the future. 
Thus, there is a relation of concepts to situations that is open and indeterminate, 
but nevertheless a relation of reference, be it of emergence in and for a situation 
or of application in a new situation.49 
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2 Transitology under Observation 
We arrive at the subject matter of our examination, transitology. Bearing in mind we are 
interested in its historical construct from all sides of the relation, vertical and horizontal, 
it occupies as a cultural field. 
Economics as it is in the 21st century is in the words of Robert Gilpin a toolbox of 
formal models and analytical techniques. The concern here lies in the application of any 
analyses for they require measurable forms. Thus models define the subject of 
economics. What is transition then from the point of view of economics? It is the 
definition of what was incommensurable before.  And as Paul Krugman argues, no 
models for development have been created. 50 What is transition from the point of view 
of political science? It is applicability of universalist models of action on contingent 
political situations. Thus we are left with transition into economic measurability and 
universalist predictability. What prescribed this condition? As considered in the 
Introduction, to answer the question I must first take one step backwards in history 
before continuing with theoretical steps. 
 
2.1 The Post-Modern Challenge in Social Sciences 
Repercussions of the post-modern challenge - undermining the aforementioned 
dialectics of social theory and social thought - were felt in the social sciences at the time 
when the first forms of transitology began to take form in the late 80s and early 90s. The 
post-modern challenge undermined historical constructions of social structures and 
rather perceived the world as a mere continuous flow of images and reflections, non-
binding and uncontestable. Steven Best writing on historical vision in 1995: 
The horizon of a liberatory future is increasingly clouded by a growing sense 
that the fundamental dynamics of change, transformation, progress and 
emancipation are over.51 
The post-modern challenge did not emerge out of the blue. During the 20th century the 
extension of the horizon of the possible had redefined politics-as-activity.52 This 
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politicization was inherently contestational by nature, possibilities opened new 
possibilities and counter-possibilities. An institutionalization of the forms of searching 
and most importantly defining political possibilities followed, escalating with the 
bipolar world order. This institutionalization during the 20th century began from the 
innate rationalization of an individual’s horizon of possibilities, from Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s empowerment of the individual himself searching for and evaluating 
the relations between the possibilities, described in his 1863 novel. And with the rise of 
social engineering such rationalizations were harnessed to form systems of thought most 
eminently within the spaces of nation-states and then in the union of socialist and 
nationalist thought, as Lenin’s insistance on concerted aims and action. Lastly politics 
originating from utopian thought eclipsed as was exemplified in Jeffrey Sachs’s 
discreditation of the whole contestation for the horizon of the possible in favor of one 
system. And indeed, at the time Sachs wrote his article What is to Be Done?  it appeared 
that no politicized institutions could exert enough control over knowledge formation, to 
claim stake as to legitimately search for possibilities – widen the horizon of possible 
action - not to mention value relations between the possibilities. A reactionary structural 
reformation in society - discussed in chapter 5 and described by Alain Touraine - was 
and is still underway. In this situation, characterized by a lack of historical dimension, 
since about 1980, the idea of the decline of politics was a hot topic in western social 
sciences and had a popular character to it and was also widely addressed and supported 
in academic literature53 . 
Thus, in the wake of the post-modern challenge, prophesized by the likes of Baudrillard 
and Fukuyama, we find our defining moment, the collapse of the soviet system of 
belief. Post-modernism in social sciences undermined our dialectical other, historical 
materialism and later dependency theorists, both perceiving the realities of the world to 
be structured from the flows of capital and social violence and class, core and 
ideological conflicts. In reference to the dialectical roots of transition brought up in this 
paper it is worth mentioning that it is a common tendency of many of the varied 
“postmodern” accounts to dismay and refute Enlightenment concepts54. 
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 The postmodern depreciation of history did not have the same impact on empirical 
modernists, neoliberal and neoclassical political economists as they need not derive any 
assumptions from historical legacies. And as such they functioned as something of a 
naturalist pathway for social scientists out of the post-modern challenge. I use the term 
naturalist because this escape mitigated the requirement to describe and explain one’s 
own perspective, distancing the researcher and his field as mere operators of causal 
variables. But, a relativism of perspectives – perspectivism - in social theory is 
unintelligent. No perspective is without an origin. I follow the social theorist Peter 
Wagner in answering how these origins behoove us: 
Perspectivism takes an entirely different shape as soon as one is able to address 
the question of the point of view from which a perspective emerges; it turns into 
a pluralism of related and relateable perspectives.55 
The incorporation of the post-modern challenge and its origins and dialectics into an 
analysis of the emergence of transitology becomes an important structural fault line. 
 
2.2 Transitology Paradigm 
Around the time of the rise of the post-modern challenge the unexpected 
democratizations in Greece, Portugal and Spain in Southern Europe and in many Latin 
American countries gave the impetus for the influential study on transition by the 
political scientists O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, stating that no preconditions 
for democratization need be present, and focusing on elite-level causal variables. This 
also contested the paradigm of modernization theories based on historical progress 
explained with universalist preconditions. Yet, at the same time a new coming of 
modernization theory focusing on global rather than national trends was claiming 
ground in explaining the Soviet 80s. President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz 
referred to the “worldwide democratic revolution”56. Jordan Gans-Morse in his article 
states that as the Soviet Union fell apart these two stood as distinct and contrasting 
approaches to regime change, but that yet they are often packed together and criticized 
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as representatives of the same paradigm.57 How these traditions intertwined around the 
formation of transitology is examined in this thesis. 
I perceive that from these positions around the 80s began the formation of the scientific 
field of transitology, with inbred distinct cleavages, yet clear positions on causal 
relations, reflecting a deductive-nomological model on politics and a macro-level 
modernization paradigm attributing development and progress a moralistic dimension. 
In 2002 the democracy assistance expert Thomas Carothers declared the end of 
transition paradigm. He argued that holding on to transitology is retarding policies of 
democratic assistance. The hopes of a quick progress toward liberal democracies 
assumed by early transitology should be abandoned to better analyze political change in 
countries that are locked in their ‘transitional’ structures in many ways.58 Carothers 
argument is based on the relation between policy and theory. It seems that coming to 
2002 transitological theory could no longer tap into the post-socialist political space 
without contestation, thus I argue we are witnessing a transformation and consolidation 
of transitology. This consolidation happens through a capitalization of the existing 
character of transitology. Carothers observes certain structures consolidating themselves 
in the transitional countries, entrenched and regular political patterns59, instead of a 
constant progress towards democracy. This will reflect onto transitology, shape it and 
allow it to anchor around specific features stemming from its original character. 
Two years after Carothers proclamation Gans-Morse concludes that post-communist60 
studies are no longer hegemonically dominated by transitology. He states that 
transitology as a term is used in multiple ways referring to a variety of studies. More 
often than not it is the critics of transitology that employ the term when referring to 
approaches aiming at generalizable theories.61 
According to Gans-Morse ‘conventional transitology’ committed to pregiven futures or 
pasts of capitalism, democracy or authoritarianism and positing a notion of development 
with comparisons to institutions and concepts of consolidated democracies is criticized 
by a variety of authors. They are then joining the discourse on the form of transitology 
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when criticizing it. In mid 1990s arguments on behalf of an open-ended transformation 
were posed. Even though Gans-Morse fails to find actual evidence of teleological 
notions of progress in transitological articles he concludes that transition is often 
perceived as transition specifically to democracy.62 In Gans-Morse’s analysis the 
content of transitology is seen to differ from perceptions of it. 
Competing definitions of “transitology” have multiplied the contexts in which 
the term is used, thereby contributing to the widespread impression that a 
transitological approach to the study of regime change dominates post-
communist studies.63 
I do not fully follow Gans-Morse in his separation of studies in transitology and the 
debate over its nature. These are mutually inclusive discourses. Gans-Morse also 
defines transitology too narrowly as the so-called mainstream and most criticized 
perspective on post-communist studies. He himself then goes to demonstrate this 
inclusive and wider character of the cultural field that I refer to as transitology with two 
points. Firstly, Gans-Morse concludes that the debate on deleterious effects of perceived 
‘mainstream transitology’ has detracted attention from the actual goal of post-
communist studies: to build new theory. Secondly, he states: 
The variety and uniqueness of post-communist regimes is fertile ground for 
exploring novel political and economic systems, and this diversity presents the 
opportunity for analysts to develop new ways of utilizing ideal types so as to 
theorize transition in a non-teleological yet theoretically rigorous manner.64 
We find thus that the cultural field is far from fading away under an internal strain of 
various approaches, but consolidating itself upon the very cleavages discussed by Gans-
Morse. The discourse is part and parcel of the reproduction of transition paradigm. 
Three years after Gans-Morse’s account on debates of transitology and call for a move 
forward the Lithuanian political scientists Jankauskas and Gudžinskas conclude in their 
article on transitology’s condition in 2007 that “the report of transitology’s death was an 
exaggeration”. They thus conform to Gans-Morse’s suggestions. Jankauskas and 
Gudžinskas go as far as to declare transitology’s renewed potential in its normative 
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aims, which they define as bringing democracy to the world. 65 We are able to observe 
the self-reflection and reproduction of the cultural field. How this reproduction takes 
place is affected by the origins and character of transitology examined in this paper and 
answered in the conclusions of this paper.  
I therefore believe to arrive at a satisfactory definition of transitology by connecting the 
studies in societal transformation in the post-socialist space to a viewpoint on 
unprecedented change and incorporating the debate on transitology into the cultural 
field as a binding force legitimizing the cultural competition and distinctions. 
 
2.3 Transitional Instruments and Incommensurability 
Taking then into account three factors of economics described by Robert Gilpin I am 
able to outline the nature of discursiveness present in transition. The first factor is that 
the history of events leading to disequilibrium is not relevant for the restoration of 
equilibrium. Secondly, the wide variety of different schools of economic thought all 
start from different assumptions. And thirdly, Modern economics assume that the 
individual is the basic unit of society.66 When these three factors are superimposed upon 
a class of social existence deprived of a unifying middle class ideology, what happens is 
the strengthening of lateral movements imposed by the hidden dispositions of the class 
habitus67. These dispositions are homogenous with the marginalizing cleavages of 
modern world-economy. This is in essence the discursiveness of transition from theories 
of political economy to the individual or the household.  
Many proponents then and prominently Anders Åslund, who is one of the most prolific 
commentators of transition as well as one of the most distinct in representing a certain 
view perhaps aptly described as economism, consider transition and its market 
economic reforms to be and to have been highly successful68. In certain countries the 
reforms were implemented more rigorously leading to better results, once we then also 
add an extra component of country specific and varying geopolitical and historical 
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legacies we arrive at the conclusion of the effect of transition policies: Today these 21 
countries that were once according to Åslund so similar have become rather diverse69, 
some succeeded in heading the advice others not. Åslund clearly opposes a historical 
perspective. Measured through econometrics the countries now appear different whereas 
under socialism they seemed similar. Therefore apparently a clear cut escape from the 
chronic constraints of ‘static’ socialism has been achieved. On the other hand 
Derluguian amongst others emphasizes the historical differences of these countries 
stemming from especially the year ‘68. 
Åslund quotes Tolstoy, and I remain unsure if he here fails to see Tolstoy's irony in an 
attempt to be ironical or fails to see his own irony in an attempt to use Tolstoy’s. All 
happy families are similar, but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.70 A 
temporal dissection of space to create relativistic unities seems apparent, the attribution 
of failures to particulars and successes to universalisms. 
Similarly, writing in his 2004 published introduction to his own 1995 article Stanley 
Fischer, the 1994-2001 First Deputy Managing Director of IMF, tells us that in 1995 
controversies within the IMF were abounded, shock therapy or gradualism, inflation 
stabilization or high inflation to launch growth, fixed or flexible exchange rates and 
manners of price and trade liberalization and privatization. Conclusions from the early 
experience, before 1994, were extracted through the EBRD’s71 Transition Report72 and 
from indices on the extent of structural reform. The problem at hand was still that data 
and methods of analysis were not yet sufficiently refined to answer further economic 
questions.73 Fischer writes that now, a decade after the transition began, transition 
countries are no longer treated as a single group. 74 
In 1995 Fischer sets the establishment of a market-economy as the goal of transition. 
Major problems arise from the quality of data available for policy formulation. 
Conceptually, Fischer states, prices for goods were not comparable to world market 
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prices and at a measurement level the data is not corresponding to basic macroeconomic 
division of private and state markets. 75 
Once trade and price controls were lifted in the beginning of the transition process 
inflation skyrocketed reaching commonly three-digit annual inflation rates. When 
systematic differences in data arise Fischer simply changes the population under 
measure not to breach contextual commensurability. 
In his Fischer’s analysis determinants of growth and inflation are derived through 
econometric analysis, whereas explanatory variables are the macroeconomic policies 
and the extent of structural reforms being measured as an economic liberalization index. 
This liberalization index was based on data of EBRD’s Transition Reports 1994 and 
1995.76 
It is noteworthy that macroeconomic policy as commonly understood in market 
economies did not exist in more than half the countries before 199277 and yet is 1989 
taken to be the year when the transformations began.78 
Fischer concludes that growth requires stabilization and stabilization leads to growth. 
However, he continues, there are alternative interpretations of the connection between 
inflation and growth, for example it may be that stabilization succeeds only if growth 
follows or that there actually is no link between growth and stabilization and the link is 
rather forced by international financial institutions. Fourthly Fischer suggests that it 
may be that stabilization and growth are simply part of a larger set of actions. 79 
On another article Stanley Fischer examines the question: “How long it will take the 
CEE countries to reach the income levels of the poorer West European countries.” 
Fischer examines six countries of the CEE between 1937 and 1992 and concludes that a 
relative decline between them and other European countries has happened during the 55 
years, but amongst the six the relative positions have not changed. 80 
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As Brian Snowdon aptly states, the transition experiment became and has remained a 
fertile ground for imaginative research and controversy among economists.81 
Snowdon continues that earlier both Bukharin and Luxemburg prophesized the coming 
of socialism to be the end of economics as a science82, from what we are able to detect 
now from the account of Fischer in establishing transition measurements, they were not 
wrong in the sense, that a serious re-economization has been required for modern 
economics to be able to begin its analyses. And only through a re-economization it is 
possible to conduct any analyses. 
Snowdon, an economist and researcher, goes to quote a 1991-1992 study in which the 
values of Russian citizens are shown to be more those associated with capitalism and 
thus, according to Snowdon, demonstrating that unlike Homo Sovieticus, Homo 
Economicus is and was alive and well. 83 Could we interpret this as potential 
correspondence to economization? 
Whether the key institutional structures supporting a market economy, which in the core 
countries have developed organically over a long historical period, can be transplanted 
to transition countries has been one of the key issues to be contested. Among other 
issues that gradualists advocate have been the importance of informational 
imperfections, the importance of social and organizational capital and the need for legal 
and institutional structures. The counter argument has often been that in the context of 
the East European transition, the issue at hand was the adjustment of an already 
industrialized economy. Within this economy the task at hand was the reallocation of 
resources into efficient and competitive sectors. 84 Efficient in what manner and 
competitive against who are not issues that would be dealt with, they are inherent in the 
toolbox of economic theory, for only variables within the same system, thus following 
similar equations, can be commensurable. Following the philosopher of science Ian 
Hacking, an apparatus to generate data is created, the apparatus is then naturally judged 
by its ability to produce data and incommensurability results from phenomena being 
produced by fundamentally different techniques85. This is very much the extent of how 
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data sets instrumentally restrict inquiry and can be seen as a cause for 
incommensurability and ahistoricity before and after the establishment of the apparatus. 
After the initial boom, once serious competition had arisen, but the economization 
process was still taking its first steps with the EBRD Transition Reports having begun in 
1994, a 1996 World Bank paper From Plan to Market highlights the importance to 
recognize the historically determined initial economic and political circumstances of 
each economy86. These properties are then said to affect the range of reform policies 
available. In such a manner the new economies are then divided and an initial zero-state 
is constructed. On the level of global political economy this functions in balancing the 
large dialectical cleavage between the cold war systems in favor of country specific 
cleavages. Such a move can be seen to ease any discursive action and improve system 
wide panopticism by creating new economized relations. Panopticism is a term initially 
taken from Michel Foucault by Stephen Gill and refers to endogenous structures of 
control, born out of the formation of the system itself. A simplistic example of 
panopticism in a system would be the Concert of Europe. 
 
2.4 Universal Concepts for an Evolutionary Transitology 
Returning to Anders Åslund, early on in a 1992 article he analyses the problems of the 
1990-1991 reform plans. He begins by describing consensus among scholars on the 
issue that transition must be achieved rapidly and that there must be a comprehensive 
switch to a fully-fledged market economy. Åslund lists shortcomings in the principal 
reform programs of Gorbachev in 1990 and its continuation, the 1991 Anti-crisis 
Program of Prime Minister Pavlov and in contrast the Shatalin Program of August 1990. 
These shortcomings include among others neglect of democracy, relations between 
center and the republics, unfounded belief in gradual transition and excessive 
confidence in the state apparatus and the inability to conceptualize a market economy. 87 
As is evident from these formulations, I focus on the instruments of actions rather 
than the consequences of action or non-action (such as inflation or shortages).88 
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Åslund lists democracy, form of the union, false beliefs, confidence in state or perhaps 
the state itself and conceptualization of a market economy as instruments of action. In a 
sense Åslund is correct. It is clear that beliefs and conceptualizations clash with and 
constitute the habitus of social groupings.  On the other hand Åslund concludes that 
these are preconditions to be solved before “true systemic change can be unleashed” and 
that problems to solve these issues are caused by a lack of intellectual comprehension89.  
Obvious observations here are, whether democratization or change of beliefs is not 
systemic change, surely not if it is assumed that some beliefs are false were as others 
represent the truth.  It seems clear that the nature of transition for Åslund is normative 
and teleological in the sense that only with certain policy and understanding of the ways 
it is achieved, it, interestingly unsurprisingly, may be achieved. Truth then becomes 
coined in the terms from which it originates and in which rests the legitimacy of the 
truth-speakers. 
Accepting such legitimization Rajan and Zingales bring forth the idea of constantly 
existing institutions, which means that whenever reforms are not carried through 
completely, true free market capitalism is not reached and new elites benefiting from the 
initial change quickly begin to resist further reforms.90 On the other hand, a complete 
reform to market capitalism is unprecedented in history. The hypothesis in itself sets 
forth two premises. First, that a complete reform according to certain guidelines within 
defined time and space is possible and, secondly, that there exist a universal market 
capitalism that can be reached and does not in itself change as the system in which it 
operates changes. 
In his conclusion on the Rise and Fall of the Socialist System Snowdon refers to Kornai 
when defining the uniqueness of the Central Eastern European transition, The ‘Great 
Transformation’ as it is termed by Kornai91. The CEE region is according to Kornai now 
back on track economically and politically with the ‘Western civilization’ in the 
economic and political sphere and the transformation has been complete. 92   
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Besides falling into a weberian definition of western specificity, with such definitions 
Snowdon and Kornai join in line with parsonian visions of systemic convergence 
towards a western model. According to Peter Wagner such a view is related to a 
distorted view on modernity, in which either the independence or autonomy of the 
individual or the institution is assumed. The autonomy of human action is then reflected 
to a contest of conceptualization attempting to define the level, from individuality to 
institutions, of autonomy. 
And this is where they are led to profoundly misconceptualise modern social life. 
Terms such as ‘democracy’ or ‘market’ certainly have one of their points of 
reference in the idea of autonomy of human action. But they provide only such 
general indications as to be almost devoid of content.93 
Transition has been a fertile, devoid, ground for reconceptualizations of old concepts of 
modernity. 
A depiction of the evolutionary nature of transition studies or transitology may be read 
from Taraz Kuzio’s description of the quadruple nature of transition. He argues that 
once the study of transitions moved from Latin America and southern Europe, where in 
most cases national integration had been achieved, to the post-socialist states, it was 
originally assumed that transition would be regime-based with two goals, 
democratization and marketization. Weakness of the post-socialist states and their 
institutions then introduced the third aspect called stateness into transition.94 All very 
applicable to the commonly told story of how post-socialist transition has been 
understood. He then goes further by arguing for the separation of the nationalism 
question as a fourth pillar from the stateness question. 
Although while bringing forth the idea of the evolutionary nature of transition, Kuzio is 
continuing this tradition and in his approach attempting to further elaborate the field of 
transitology, thus, being himself a political scientist interested in questions of 
nationalism, deriving new lineation for the field study. Such barriers ease the dissection 
of the scientific and political space of transition studies and therefore establish grounds 
for more precise theoretizations derived from already elaborated traditions, the opening 
of ecological niches on the bourdieunian cultural field.  The social sciences consist of 
                                                 
93Wagner 2001a, 166-169. 
94Kuzio Taras: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism. Ibidem-Verlag. Stuttgart 2007, 
83. 
34 
 
coherent groupings of subject matter distinct from one another. Some new niches are 
born as others die out, but this or any interdisciplinary approach does not tackle the 
some 150 years of inquiry and its premises95.   
 Putting forward his argument Kuzio tackles the established study of transition and 
derives his arguments from the partly failed process of transition in post-socialist states 
and from the “still insufficient work undertaken by political theory vis-à-vis the 
relationship between nationhood, the state and a liberal market democracy.”96 Though 
maybe bound by historical events, Kuzio presents these concepts as objects of study and 
not objectivations in themselves. The effects and limits of the act of objectivation need 
to be objectivated as well, in order to, in the first place, objectify the social conditions of 
possibility97. That is, we cannot treat our acts of objectivation as the limits of policy. 
This is important in regard the discursive and coercive nature of transition itself, when 
with its help scientific observations are converted into policy. 
Kuzio ask whether post-socialist transitologists went far enough in the creation of their 
framework. He further elaborates his point of view with the argument that modern 
liberal democracies require more or less unified nationalist polities to develop.98 In such 
a manner Kuzio removes earlier national and liberal projects from their space and time, 
assumes the nomotheticity of the concepts connected to them and argues for the 
superimposition of them, as they are now more perfectly understood, into current 
transitology with the temporally discursive claim that only then these countries may 
evolve into modern liberal democracy, into the, reportedly acclaimed, historical and 
philosophical ideas from which Kuzio began his conceptual journey.  Even with the risk 
of repeating myself I would like to stress the epistemological tautology and the violence 
with which these concepts are recast. And as such our concepts indeed seem to represent 
“indications devoid of content” or the Aristotelian grey mass, forever separated from its 
form, thus full of potential but with no capability of actualization. 
From the reasonable observation of the historically differing nature of post-socialist 
transition from other transitions Kuzio arrives at the conclusion of inadequacies of the 
concepts and analytical divides, instead of tackling the question by attempting to answer 
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why such obvious differences exist. Thus observing transition as something defined and 
insulated by its borders in space and time, as an empirically analyzable machine. 
 
2.5 Objectivated Transitology 
In their elaborately objective and conceptually historical study Åberg and Sandberg 
explore the formation of social capital in post-socialist countries, with Ukraina and 
Poland as their examples. They conclude both that sociocultural roots take on a different 
meaning in a post-communist context compared to Western countries and that historical 
path-dependencies do matter.99 Deriving from the historical experiences of the countries 
they conclude that through political oppression distrust on the state has created social 
capital based rather on intra-group cooperation then bridging of interests. This divide 
has then been either enhanced, as in Nazi Germany, or suppressed as in the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand they see the same historical roots as strengthening continuities 
in basic political-culture and institutional set-ups. Åberg and Sandberg then derive 
explanations for the post-communist experience from the conceptual history of 
democracy itself.100 
The institutions of actual democracy evolve, yet the fundamental idea of 
democracy remains more or less the same historically. This is the reason why 
definitions of the institutional traits of democracy are time- and space-
dependent, while the general notions of democracy are not. 
Following Åberg and Sandberg it is easy to ask whether it was the uniqueness of the 
post-socialist transition - though Åberg and Sandberg themselves do not use the concept 
of transition - and the lack analytical tools and concepts which ushered in the second 
wave of transitology with an eye for new temporal dissections with institutionalism(s) 
and further spatial dissection with social and national perspectives or whether time and 
space, creating our unit of analysis, had affected the capitalist-economy and social order 
and therefore the definitions of transition in the system, the scientifically institutional 
traits of the concept, were so open for the taking and then easily contested. 
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Åberg and Sandberg differentiate the process of democratization from the concept of a 
democracy itself and depict the paths for democratization as far from given.101 They 
may then observe the post-communist democratization without having to burden 
transition with anything, before beginning their objectivation. They are partly able to 
avoid positioning themselves on the field of transition, instead duplicating firmly 
established objectivations. Thus, they are easily able to refrain from the use of the 
concept itself; the novelty of post-socialist transition likely enables this. If transition 
would become too drastically defined and epistemologically connected to earlier 
definitions of economics, political science and so forth, it might prove harder for Åberg 
and Sandberg to proceed in the same manner without arousing normative debates on the 
subject of their study. 
 
2.6 Demands for Initial Conditions 
Some scholars of transition and transitology make attempts to come break away from 
universalist categories and succeed in partial revisions of aspects of research often 
treated in an a priori non-objectivated manner. Yet, this easily leads to a discrepancy 
between the bulk of their concepts and the revised aspect, which is then compromised 
by a demand for initial conditions. This means that they trace the cause of this 
discrepancy to a moment in time of transition and describe it as misunderstood or 
unnoticed. This problem is then amended with a description of the conceptual or factual 
conjuncture. Better than nothing, but this is still partly teleological in explaining the past 
problems from the present context of transitological thought. 
In her study of politics and property rights in the post-soviet space the political scientist 
Jessica Allina-Pisano arguments through a case study of a Ukrainian collective farm, 
that despite the low-to-mid level institutional capabilities of functioning, what mattered 
during the land privatization schemes of transition were the structural adjustment 
policies on the national level, which determined the new incentives. The options to an 
individual were, and would have been according to Allina-Pisano dispositions towards 
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either resisting redistribution of the collective’s land or to resign himself of the benefits 
and informal distribution networks of the collective to begin anew.102   
Thus we may observe both the marginalization caused by renewed state level habitus 
imposing demands in individual dispositions as well as a coercive move leading either 
to marginalization or discursiveness between formerly unimportant divides. 
In dealing with the dynamics of the interaction of transitional policies and actual 
historicity Berkeley based professor of economics and political science Gerard Roland 
makes the claim that in the context of transitology rent-seeking is tied to initial wealth 
and power. On the other hand initial wealth and power might have affected the 
privatization policies leading to further rent-seeking opportunities. 103 
When trying to understand the positive political economy of reforms in transition 
countries, it is important to have a better understanding of the social and 
political initial conditions of reforms, which should reach beyond the economic 
initial conditions that have often been analyzed in the literature so far.104 
Thus, when neglecting the correspondence of the unit of analysis and time and the 
structural constraints and allowances of both, we are in risk of constructing tautologies, 
the shorter and more decisive the dissection of space and time, often the more distinct 
the tautology. In such a situation the only evidence left to support the hypothesis are 
linkages to the established cultural field(s) of science. The explanan and the 
explanandum are too close to each other 
Emphasizing the importance of the initial social and political conditions Roland comes 
halfway in the direction of structural historicity, yet he creates a divide by still treating 
the post–initial state as the unit of analysis. Roland continues in favor of a more world-
systemic analytical point of view of the coercive force of the world-economy by 
asserting that aggregate uncertainty applies more to privatization processes than 
restructuring or reallocation.105 Privatization processes create vertical cleavages within 
trust networks, similarly as was the case with Allina-Pisano, whereas restructuring and 
reallocation, in order not to simply abolish value within a system, have to be built upon 
existing chains of productions and dispositions. Aggregate uncertainty can then be seen 
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as a normal condition from imposing vertical divides as any new and existing 
dispositions lack a historical habitus with which to interact and relate. 
Abstentionism is perhaps not so much a hiccup in the system as one of the 
conditions of its functioning as a misrecognized – and therefore recognized- 
restriction on political participation.106 
Non-action is effective action in itself and a constituting function or even a cleavage of 
the system. And it applies to the political, social and economic spheres at the same time, 
as these are not separable from each in any other except in a purely abstractly 
conceptual manner, not to deny that such a separation would not have its effect also.  
Moving in between the spheres of politics and economy and respectfully attempting to 
address the question of the historical view Hungarian political scientist Laszlo Bruszt 
and American economic sociologist David Stark argue that the postsocialist experience 
is the problemacy and challenge of simultaneously transforming property regimes and 
extending citizenship rights. Writing in 1998 they state that “each of the East Central 
European societies has solidified its democratic institutions and achieved economic 
growth”. Bruszt and Stark see the postsocialist laboratory as a source for new concepts 
and categories to understand economic and democratic change in general by elaborating 
upon older literature in light of the postsocialist experience. Through a comparative lens 
they seek to avoid the all pervasive telos of neoliberalism and rather understand ongoing 
conflicts shaping the horizon of possibilities.107 
They hope to discern the varying legacies of socialism as differing building blocks for 
democracy and varieties of capitalism. Stressing not to make too strong a priori 
distinction between strategies of survival and of innovation, they allot significant weight 
to non-state and non-market interorganizational networks. Bruszt and Stark’s analysis 
attempts to shed the constraints of one sided or universalist theories in favor of 
discursive strategies of de-liberation outside the state and market hierarchies. They 
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suggest that an extension of horizontal accountability in time and in scope would 
similarly extend time horizons of policy makers and the public.108 
Bruszt and Stark attempt ambitiously to tackle the issues of non-transformative politics 
and policies and turn back the development of a diminishing scope of possible action. 
And rightly they evoke the distinctive forms of social accountability on the political 
field to constrain the competition between classes of differing conditions of existence. 
Through such activity the cultural field might be able to consolidate itself in a mutually 
enforcing response to the exerted influence of encroaching and entrenched traditions of 
social sciences. 109 
Such a jump to the bandwagon of transitology has partly been successful amongst the 
East Central European authors such as Bruszt himself, yet the double competition of the 
cultural field in response to the world-economy, reflected upon policy makers 
connecting vertically to both the public habitus and to traditions of thought, has, at least 
in hindsight, not consolidated itself even in East Central Europe. 
Even though refreshingly optimistic in their account, Bruszt and Stark would seem to 
misjudge the weight and form of transition studies on their own account. Differentiating 
pathways and varieties of capitalism offer the denomination of an extended scope of 
possible action but do not emancipate the topos of politics for meritocratic competition, 
for extending the horizon, rather instigate a headless search amongst the informal 
networks for the leprechaun’s pot of gold. In their analysis Bruszt and Stark fail to 
tackle the question of objectivating their own analysis, they attempt a relocation of the 
dislodged habitus and cultural field by not taking over history but rather affirming to it 
on the political level, by tackling – rightfully so – the dominant problem of ahistoricity 
with an ahistorically derived competition against the discursiveness of the dominant 
regime.  Where arguing in favor of historicity in policy making they dismay the issue in 
regards their own concepts. Their point of view is still one determined by the position 
they themselves occupy. 
Therefore Bruszt and Stark merely explicate non-transformative, thus systemic 
resistance. Nonetheless they deliver an accurate account and critique of features of 
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transitology, most importantly the to-and-fro dissections of time by the likes of 
Burawoy or neoliberalists and –statists. 
I covered in this chapter the basic theoretical issues we encounter in transitology when 
observing it from the viewpoint of my perspective. These issues revolve around spatial 
and temporal generalizations and ahistoricities of either or both the concepts and 
systems of thought behind analysis or the relation between the analysis and its object. 
The issues were presented through authors vividly representing particular problemacies 
in particular and transitology in general, where other authors may fall victim to similar 
obstacles or mixtures of them. The authors and issues observed here also provide a cross 
cut of the depth and evolution of tackling the various problems of objectivating ones 
own research approach historically, so that a similar type or level addressing that issue 
was not represented multiple times. 
Having exemplified the field and problemacy in it I will next describe the interplay or 
competition that is reproduced within the field through a specific example.  
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3. Reflective Approaches 
A regime may encompass forms of social reproduction that together constitute 
conditions of existence for development in a particular historical period.110 
What is the connection of a regime111 to transitology and how would this connection 
affect the mentioned constituting conditions of existence for development. Reflecting on 
an example of a reading from transitology I will glance at transitology through a 
specific example and then elaborate on radical political economy and world-systems 
analysis. We intend to better grasp the analytical tools or tuning forks employed here 
and their possible relation to competition within this particular cultural field, to the 
horizontal relations of transitology with the help of the given example. This becomes 
necessary now as I will observe relations of approaches or debates, not the actual 
approaches. Relations are non-observable as such and can therefore be detected only 
through their effects on the wider system. These effects become more easily detectable 
when set into comparison with systemically differing approaches, World-systems 
analysis and Stephen Gill’s political economy in this case. Therefore I stress that I do 
not directly operate with these analytical tools, but they are be employed as catalysts. 
I have chosen a debate between Joseph Stiglitz and three Polish economists for two 
main reasons. Representing an American and East Europeans they all worked as policy 
advisors on transition, their debate focuses on the so-called Washington consensus, 
which Stiglitz critiques and the East Europeans on their part defend. Secondly, they are 
already debating over an historical interpretation of already conducted policies, which 
they approach from very fundamental economic points of view, rather than observations 
of society 
 
3.1 Stiglitz's Debate 
Joseph Stiglitz, at the time Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, argues in a 1999 
article, that the “great economic experiment” in Eastern Europe, that is the transition, 
was ill handled due to a “misunderstanding of the very foundations of market 
economy”. That it was carried through simply by following neoclassical textbook 
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economics under the sway of the Washington consensus.112 Stiglitz continues by raising 
a number of issues in which economic theory was implemented under this aegis in an 
action not goal-oriented manner. Thus imposing measures that in themselves were to 
bring remedy instead of instigating action, which would have been based upon existing 
dispositions. 
How to understand this in the context of this study? For example, according to textbook 
theory, privatization together with competition form the basis of a working Pareto 
efficient market economy, thus forming the basis for creation of extra monetary value in 
a free market system. In the post-socialist space privatization was pursued discursively 
as means to break up existing networks of trust relying on soft-budget constraints, and 
without due respect to an institutional framework to establish dispositions for 
competition. Soft-budget constraints themselves were pursuing the same goals. 
Therefore, without due dispositions, the obscure and deep-rooted choices of the 
habitus113 of stakeholders in previously existing networks will not correspond with the 
reality of relations between goods and groups114. To simplify, if both of the boxers are 
not confined by a ring, then the other may simply run away having successfully 
delivered the first punch, breaking up the pursued Pareto-efficient reallocation. 
Returning to Stiglitz, in his article he argues further that the entries and exits, 
entrepreneurship and bankruptcy were implemented in a similar fashion by reinforcing 
bankruptcy policies into a system lacking both the incentives for and a culture of 
entrepreneurship, thus stripping the exits of their rejuvenating nature of providing fertile 
ashes for new sprouts to grow in. Thirdly, a productivity and creativity encouraging 
reward system of market capitalism – profits - requires both explicit and implicit trust, 
termed social and organization capital by Stiglitz, to function. Both of which were and 
are lacking far behind in the post-socialist societies, at least in the terms they are 
established in core market economies. This inevitably led to short term hit and run 
profiteering. Stiglitz continues with a similar pair of ownership and control and then 
moves on to elaborate the issues. 
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The points of critique raised by Stiglitz are referring to a lack of institutional and 
structural frameworks for the reproduction of benefits to work through an interaction of 
social base versus capitalist gains. This interaction is seemingly set into a historical 
continuum of interactively constituting structures, thus presenting capitalist growth as a 
developmental project. Stiglitz is promulgating specific historicity which is created in 
his view through the working of antinomic pairs which seem to stimulate economic 
growth. 
Stiglitz goes on to elaborate agency chains encompassing the majority of the population 
within successful market economies and proposes the shortening of the chains in 
transitional countries to begin constructing the foundations of a market economy115 . In 
a global division of labor this would mean a willed though perhaps necessary - from a 
structuralist view - step backwards within the division of labor, within the process of 
accumulating added value between societal and productive relations. After which 
reorganization on the proper founding principles could commence. 
With the aforementioned Washington consensus Stiglitz refers to an ideological 
approach to reform characterized strongly by shock therapy in terms of its effectual 
parts. The historical roots of this approach he traces dialectically to Jacobinism and 
Bolshevism, referring to a similar dialectical analogy as was done in chapter 1. 
The shock therapy approach tried to use many of the same [bolshevik] principles 
for the reverse transition. …With the right textbooks in their briefcases, the 
“market Bolsheviks” would be able to fly into the post-socialist countries and 
use a peaceful version of Lenin’s methods to make the opposite transition.116 
Stiglitz then gives an account of the ideological motives behind the economic reformists 
very similar to disciplinary neo-liberalism from the perspective of radical political 
economy. This is followed by an account of decisions to reform top-down rather than 
bottom-up, as political decision-making is viewed in semi-peripherial structures by 
world-systems analysis. 
Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski, all of whom acted as advisers for formulating 
transitional policices, published a critique of Stiglitz's account. They accuse him of 
fundamental misunderstandings in three aspects of the transition: A misinterpretation of 
                                                 
115 Stiglitz 1999, 142-143. 
116 Stiglitz 1999, 154. 
44 
 
the Chinese transition, which was viewed by Stiglitz successful in stimulating a bottom-
up reform process, a mis-description of the Russian transition and a failure to consider 
implications of the few in their account successful “third models” represented by 
countries like Estonia, Poland and Hungary.117 
In their rebuttals the adviser trio, instead of denying the encompassing dynamics put 
forward by Stiglitz, argue against single causalities. They mobilize into a debate over 
the causal order of the explanan and the explanandum. For example, in the case of the 
complementary behavior of privatization and structural framework for fair competition 
the trio asserts that an immature political system led to corruptions followed by capital 
flight. This is probably true, but a different matter. For whether early privatization or an 
immature political system is the cause for corruption it is irrelevant to the argument of a 
self-constituting dynamic of capitalist development, where interaction of economic and 
social factors is pursued. Conceptual differences incommensurate the debate which is in 
actuality addressing economic fundamentals and is most ironically supposed to be a 
historical debate seeking its premises from historical events. Thus, though accurate in 
their claims, the adviser trio and Stiglitz shout at each from their own garrisons on 
opposite sides of a moat, supporting the entrenchment of each other within transitology 
much in terms of a mutually reinforcing bourdieunian competition118. 
If Stiglitz is promulgating evolutionary development through antonymic concepts, much 
in a Schumpeterian manner, Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski are advancing 
universalistic structures which in themselves foster a natural environment for capitalist 
development. To exaggerate for the sake of clarification, they are pinning a naturalist 
view against a structuralist view, yet employing the same concepts, thus negating any 
synthesis, but rather entrenching their own positions. In this light it is unsurprising that 
Stiglitz connects the Washington consensus to Jacobinism and Bolshevism. 
Thus, in our view, there were no existing norms at all for the reformers to build 
new institutions upon.119 
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Since the trio assumes a zero state they advocate the need for faster and more 
encompassing reforms. Does the ‘89/’91 divide instigate a normative need for fast or 
slow reforms? Engagement into debate over sequencing and pacing follows, where 
Stiglitz would see that: 
These agency institutions need to grow incrementally and evolve over decades120 
The same types of causality based rebuttals continue in regards different aspects of 
economic development brought up by Stiglitz121. 
We also argued that the idea that the new post-Communist economic system 
should have been built in such a way as to exploit pre-existing (communitarian) 
social norms rather than copying real existing western capitalist institutions is 
mistaken…122 
It is unsurprising in this sense, that Stiglitz already in the title of his response to the 
critique proclaims the two sides of the moat not to be poles apart.123 Stiglitz dismisses 
much of the privatization debate, which was previously raised as an example, more as 
semantics than as something real, whereas the three considered it as a serious matter of 
economic formulae and empirics. World-systems analysis would describe this on a 
policy level as two reifications of an inner contradiction of a capitalist world-economy, 
the reproduction of its own inner logic, as a failure to incorporate both sides of the 
Methodenstreit into the analysis. The reproduction of this contradiction on the material 
level of a cultural field through this very debate is connected to the mutually re-
enforcing bourdieunian competition within transitology. The material connection comes 
in the form of positions, recognitions, pay check and easiness to further your own work 
(prestige). 
 
3.2 World-Systems Analysis and the New World Order 
An overarching introduction to the world-systems analysis and Stephen Gill’s radical 
political economy follows before we return to the example of Stiglitz’s debate. 
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Three defining characteristics of a world-systems perspective are the unit of analysis, 
which is the world-system, the longue durée, which in its simplest form insist on the 
historicity of the world-system and thirdly the particular world-system we live in, the 
capitalist world-economy.124 World-systems analysis situates itself through these three 
outlining aspects in conceptualizing social sciences. In examining social change it 
abides by our definition of a system. 
From a world-systemic perspective any definition of transition as a particular 
phenomenon of ex-socialist states will helplessly fall into the old trap of modernization 
theories. The claim of constrained societal progress on a national or regional level has 
been rejected at least with the rise of globalization studies. Not to say that social 
scientists would not still knowingly and unknowingly observe many a phenomenon in a 
purely Newtonian, empirical manner.  
Separations between ideographic empirical observations and historical legacies occur 
even more often when dealing with time and chronology. The inevitable historicity of 
any societal action or relation per se, as such is the nature of any causality which, if not 
common sense in social behavior, was fundamentally proved by quantum mechanics. 
The importance of the non-ideographic nature of any social event is emphasized when 
formulating policy to guide societies into a desired future. At this point I wish to stress 
the importance of the intertwined and inseparable nature of historicity and the unit of 
analysis, whereas time and space are categorically separated in our cognition, 
presupposing any such separation before analysis will lead to distortions in 
observations of social relations and (and therefore by our definition also of) social 
change as was briefly discussed in chapter 1.4. 
Finally, the socialist states were never a world-system of their own, but solidly 
connected to the world-economy and at best antisystemic, thus conceptualizations are 
subject to realities of the existing system. 
The nobles may have elaborated a vision of the universe in which they were 
understood to control natural forces or to mediate interactions with the deities 
and so commoners were supposed to be obligated to support these sacred duties 
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by turning over their produce to the nobles or contributing labor to sacred 
projects125 
The above summarizes coerciveness within hegemonies, such as presumably present in 
nomothetic transition policies or ideological hegemony in general, termed disciplinary 
neo-liberalism by Stephen Gill and seen as the ideological fuel for the cadres, those 
competing within the existing cultural fields, of the global economy by the world-
systems approach. The systems elaborated by both world-system approach and Gill's 
radical political economy are seen as self-constituting, therefore under constant change 
and as much capable of influencing their future as they are also defined by their history. 
Stephen Gill's new world order assumes a hegemony of disciplinary neo-liberalism 
through coercive politics and panoptic control, borrowing from Foucault. The main 
consequence of which is the limitation of the scope of possible political action, the 
individual is harnessed to maintain the control mechanisms sustaining the system126. A 
struggle between neo-liberal domination and resistance is at the heart of this. The 
resistance may be transformative or passive in nature. Through transformative 
resistance the scope of political action may be widened, horizon extended. This is 
historical and dialectic both horizontally and vertically, towards policies and societies 
and cultural competition and philosophical argumentation. That is to say that the system 
constitutes itself, a cumulative and repetitive process. This is in contrast to; say for 
example, standard realist or liberal approaches to the workings of the international 
political economy.  
The concept of an historical bloc, an alliance of ideological and materialist forces 
through a united class is important for radical political economy. It is similar to the 
historicity of a class habitus, anticipating particular meaning and value in relation to the 
correspondence between goods and groups. Economists such as Stiglitz and the trio 
criticizing him would thus belong to the dominant bloc of the moment as they fight over 
the definition of that correspondence against each other instead of aiming to actively 
transform it. 
The main thrusts of critique that Gill thus presents to universalist traditional economics 
is the impossibility of ahistorical freedom, which is the type advocated in any rational 
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agent based economic formulas. The critiques idea resonates closely with utopian social 
mobilization. 
When analyzing change, that is when conducting any social research, Gill sets social 
structures as the fundamental character of the unit of analysis127. This is a conceptual 
difference with world-systems analysis, which insists on the global economy to be the 
proper unit of analysis. The difference stems from Gills gramscian roots in contrast to 
WSA's128 more materialist Marxism. Therefore when reflecting causal analysis within 
transitology Gill's conceptualizations might prove more fruitful and the world-systems 
approach when investigating the dissection and relation of analysis to time and space. 
This distinction guides our application of concepts in examining transitology from the 
two otherwise very similar fields. 
Systemic subjection of peripheral and semi-peripheral economies constituting the 
system is a joint view and thus both approaches advocate systematic dependency in 
contrast to modernist developmentalism. 
The communist project is seen by Gill as a counter-hegemonic maneuver whereas WSA 
would describe it as a semi-peripheral attempt to shed the chain of core power through a 
redivision of labor, rather antisystemic then counter-hegemonic. In the end WSA 
perceives antisystemic movements however deemed to failure because of the inability to 
escape the system, in Gills terms this means a lack of transformative power whereas 
WSA would see it as an effect of polarization and bifurcation, an inner contradiction of 
the capitalist world-economy simply accelerating its expansion. Manuela Boatca has 
described from a world-systems perspective the attempts in Romania before World War 
II to bring forth antisystemic change: 
In the capitalist world-economy, counter-hegemonic ideologies rooted in a 
different cultural background than that of the dominant core have constituted a 
frequent means of challenging core power from semiperipheral locations.129 
So far these attempts have but yielded stronger core intervention or a period of non-
transformative counter-hegemony. Though, Boatca concludes that semi-peripheries are - 
besides a source of systemic crises which means a pressure vent of the system - the 
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most potential source for transformative politics. Thus, the two approaches are not far 
from each other. 
These critical approaches may widen our understanding of transitology from one 
particular perspective to allow an objectivation of relations hastily built during the 
tumults of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is clear that by nature these 
approaches contradict with the bulk of transition studies; therefore it is self-evident that 
conflicts between them are to be found. What we are to concern ourselves with, is the 
form of these conflicts, not simply their existence. 
 
3.3 Concrete Connections 
The old institutions could not function as the social norms that had under-pinned 
them no longer existed.130 
Criticizing Stiglitz, Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski see that the fall of the socialist 
structure deprived legitimacy from the old institutions. Stiglitz on the other hand sees 
that the introduction of new economic policies deprived legitimacy from institutional 
arrangements. A world-systemic aspect would point to the disappearance of a certain 
division of labor, therefore also to the disappearance of the old meritocratic social 
norms which were built upon that division, a dismantling of the reactionary class 
habitus. Now, incorporation deeper into the capitalist world-economy, without an 
influential middle class automatically brings forth the effects of semi-peripherization. 
Therefore, we should not be asking whether the erosion of the old system or the rise of 
the new system constituted the state of existence at a given moment, but rather identify 
a historical change within the social space. 
A similar example in relation to radical political economy can be made of the flight of 
capital after privatization in a financially weakly institutionalized state, also a causality 
debate touched upon by Stiglitz and his critics and arguably providing scientific 
legitimization to established parties contesting the direction of the causality. Gill 
perceives that there exists an evolving dialectic relationship between the nature and 
scope of markets and the forms of state regulation. Therefore: “capital as a social 
relation depends on the power of the state to define, shape and be part of a regime of 
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accumulation.”131 And a form of such power disintegrated in ‘89/’91. Thus any 
expected causality would have to be instigated by the weakness of capital as a social 
relation when observing it in the post-socialist space. This condition would appear to 
underline the importance of a causal debate more in terms of appropriation within the 
cultural field of transitology and based on disciplinary views derived from the 
established social sciences. 
Following Gill we might also point out the balance between coercive neo-liberalism and 
non-transformative or, deriving from Ernst Bloch, pessimist reactionarism towards neo-
liberalism132. An important concept in Gills theory is the disciplinary aspect of neo-
liberalism. He elaborates on this by quoting the World Bank World Development Report 
of 1997, “on ‘locking in’ the rights of capital and thereby ‘locking out’ democratic 
control over key aspects of the political economy”133 Therefore, he continues, “…to 
coercively contain the contradictions between capital accumulation and social 
reproduction…”134. Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski then strike a similar chord 
with this definition, “…corruption (which we take to be a measure of the degree to 
which norms are not suited to the needs of a market economy)…”135. This means two 
things. Firstly, an explanatory value of Gill’s conceptualizations in bringing out the 
underlying fundamentals, which I argue are not clearly present or discussed in the 
debate between Stiglitz and the Trio. Secondly the definition for a pessimist non-utopian 
reaction, that is denying such inherent problems as corruption to derive from 
incommensurability and incompatibility of the social space with discursive economic 
policy demands and rather focusing on the connection between policy and theory to 
have been understood erroneously. Further elaboration on this incommensurability 
follows in chapter 4. 
To further exemplify the meaning of the concepts of coercive and disciplinary policies 
and their contradictions with social reproduction we may quote Gill: “By the same 
token, the processes that capture and include normalized segments of the population can 
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serve to exclude or marginalize others”136 And then point out an explanandum of  
marginalization from world-systems analysis: 
The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy affect national 
policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single 
national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction 
within the larger system137 
We should then attempt to look at a possible correlation of such policies with the 
theoretizations from which they are derived, but first we outline a narrative for the 
historical conditions that defined those theorizations. 
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4. Contingencies and Structures around Transitological Thought 
Having observed problemacies of transitology and their interplay with the use of 
concepts derived from radical political economy and world-system analysis I describe 
the characteristics that can be associated with early paths to transitology and 
transitological thought. In line with the research undertaken in this thesis I am not 
writing an early history of transitology, but attempting to construe it. Coupled with 
examples, formulations to discover a first shaping form of transition are made – bearing 
in mind reflections from Gill and Wallerstein. In chapter 4.3 I extend the search from 
the horizontal relations and history of transition studies within social sciences to the 
vertical implications towards social space with the concept of habitus. 
 
4.1 Nature of Transition Theories 
As one polish economist has put it, “You don’t try to cross a chasm in two 
jumps”138 
As the then Harvard economist and advisor to Poland and Yugoslavia Jeffrey Sachs 
illustrated in his article139, transition was from the beginning seen as a shift from one 
system to another with no connections or realities but an empty chasm in between. I 
argue that even with new critical theories of transition, such as regulatory, evolutionary, 
governance and keynesian140, this attitude has persisted. 
Interestingly as well, and in a book intriguingly dedicated to Yegor Gaidar, Yacek 
Rostowski argues that macroeconomic instability is in itself a transitional phenomenon. 
He sees the fall of the state system as the reason for the adoption of the market and as 
the cause for the ‘jump to the market’, since resource allocation was no longer dictated. 
Therefore, the birth of markets was a natural requisite.141 The birth of transition can be 
thus linked to the need for policy formation. 
Therefore the importance and justification of an overlook and theoretical 
problematization of transition theory is in fact the flipside of my work. The claim is that 
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transition theory is an instrumental as well as a constitutive part of transition itself and 
cannot be seen, as it is commonly seen on debating fronts as a set of universal and 
nomothetic guidelines, but the fronts and the dialectics between them and then again 
between society and theory must be interpreted as an organic part of the actual 
“transition”. Following the same sentiment I further argue that transition is not a process 
that is undertaken and has a beginning and an end but should be treated as a 
conceptualizing and conceptualized term referring to an era in time and space. Much in 
the way as terms such as industrialization or nation-building are used. 
Instead of being treated in the manner it should be, research is advocating the 
uniqueness, peculiarity and extremities of transition, often in order to promote a 
particular approach or attack another, whereas transition could be conceptualized as a 
historical and constitutive part of societal reproduction in a global world-system. 
Whoever sets out to implement Utopian plans will in the first instance wipe clean 
the canvas on which the real world is painted142   
The quotation is from Ralf Dahrendorf’s article written in 1990 in which he sets an open 
society as the ideal goal for ex-socialist states to pursue. As such it is part of a wider 
struggle of prioritizations and processes. Dahrendorf attacks the notion of utopian goal-
oriented and systemic action to put forth his own emphasis on an open-society as the 
prerequisite for any societal progression. At the same time he utilizes the full force of 
western political thought to discredit the communist past and any possible Third Way 
approach143 to transition. Dahrendorf prioritizes society in the economy, society, politics 
divide. Attacking the notion of utopian social planning Dahrendorf sides up with its 
counterpart; He derives nomothetic laws from his conceptualization of an open society, 
which when implemented, he argues, may permit the appearance of a working 
modernist capitalist society, he outlines an ahistorical causation. 
 The distinction between natural law and utopian plans144 as discussed by Jürgen 
Habermas145  in relation to transition societies represents another divide on the 
theoretical battleground that is the transition. 
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Where utopian planning needs to distance itself from the existing system, the natural 
laws approach draws from that system ahistorical laws. This divide then roughly also 
establishes the line between the hegemonic approach, termed often as Washington 
consensus146, (natural laws) and the anti-hegemonic (systemic utopian planning). This is 
an overall description on the onset of transitology as the post-modern challenge cleared 
space for revitalization of the modernist paradigm within western social sciences. 
Both approaches as well as revisionists in between attempt to claim ground on specific 
contestable aspects.  The hegemonic side could be described to have been the 
dominating modernist and neoliberal theory emphasizing neoclassical economics and 
the anti-hegemonic as the constructivist theories looking at the interconnectedness of 
economics, social behavior, institutions and say for example incentives and agency: 
The crisis of the dualistic reading of political economy has led to the growth of 
alternative claims surrounding the ways in which state, market and institutions 
intersect.147 
The constructivists, as the ones quoted above, argue for the existence of varieties of 
capitalisms depending on the society at question and that therefore an interconnected 
bottom-to-up approach yields true results. Nevertheless, as the authors admit, this 
approach fails to take into account the uneven relationship and development of systems 
of accumulation and regulation on global and on sub-national level148. These are more 
strongly present in radical political economy which is employed here in search of 
conjunctures between theory and reality and most importantly their relation.  
Thus the anti-hegemonic approaches gained ground after an initial boom and failure of 
strictly economical and neoclassical policies. They were quick to move in once any 
openings for an alternative approach appeared. For example in 1998, advocating a 
bottom-to-up interconnected industrial restructuring John Pickles directly attacks the 
natural law approach: 
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Of Course, one might argue that the pathology of transition described here is 
merely ‘transitional’- a legacy of the past that will be swept away by the 
emergence of a rational calculus of cost-benefits, market incentives and 
entrepreneurial drive.149 
But Pickles himself fails to realize that the pathology of transition indeed is the state of 
transition and as such, forgive me for the tautology, no anomaly at all, a semi-peripheral 
cleavage between the historically constructed social habitus and systemic coercion, 
where the model of meritocratic interaction between structures and historical 
dispositions experienced a swift change. 
After the initial harsh rejection of the utopian and Marxist models of social engineering 
and together with the slight anti-hegemonic counter-swing a rereading of Marx has 
contributed to similar observations of these dichotomies. Quoting for example Meghnad 
Desai: 
In a sense it was not a matter of the end of history but the end of hope.150 
These observations have often led to a rejection of nation-state based socialism or the 
old dialectics and to a call forth for a new global and renewed bottom-to-up version of 
Marxist thought151 and a reawakening of Marxist spirit152 
To sum up, the classical divide of economy, society and politics was at the onset split by 
the dialectics of utopias and natural laws. This was then furthermore split into two sides 
by the theoretical and epistemological debate between top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top 
approaches, connected closely to the scope and level of analysis.  As an end result we 
have an ongoing fight to claim rights to the uniqueness of transition. I argue that on the 
case of both or all sides this leads to a situation which Dahrendorf in his imperativeness 
prescribed for the utopians: 
The probability must be high that in the end we will be stuck with transition153 
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For none of them addresses the question of historical continuities without temporally 
dissecting transition from where it grew out of. State socialism is analyzed, but only to 
describe a ground zero on which transition would then build upon. Therefore not only 
transition societies but transition theory has been savaged, exploited and used, actually 
simply conjured up, by advocates of the ever competing lines of demarcation within 
social sciences. As can be read for example from Smith and Pickles’ statement: 
At the end of the twentieth century there is a need, then, for an alternative set of 
conceptual frameworks on transition to challenge the neo-liberal hegemony…154 
For another example I return to Åslund whom I described as treating transition 
normatively and teleologically and to Åberg and Sandberg who did see the trouble to 
differentiate between concepts and processes. In this regard Åslund represents the 
opposite of Åberg and Sandberg, but in a very understandable manner he also represents 
the beginning of the double transition as described by Kuzio in that he is simple 
applying objectivizations of concepts, such as democracy and the markets, to policies 
and referring to shortcomings as a lack of intellectual comprehension. 
In conjunction they are all then molding the concept of transition. Kuzio is both writing 
the evolution of the history of transition from the mentioned zero-state and then 
maturing it through complications. Åberg and Sandberg lineate the concept 
scientifically to the existing narrative by evoking classics of western thought and 
Åslund entrenches the policy normative discursiveness, the nomotheticity. Thus they 
both compete against each other for the right to write of transition, claiming their 
position on the cultural field, but not against each other, and in such they may be seen to 
mutually justify each other in concert. They are going from the concrete to the abstract, 
from the particular to the universal.  For such action a concept must evolve, so that it is 
apparent to all that they speak of the same subject matter. The process of (scientific) 
legitimization concerns also the relationship of subjects regarding the object155, 
according to Bourdieu. In relation to this Bourdieu also cites Ben-David, “the allocation 
of scientific recognition is usually supranational and, at least to some extent, 
supradisciplinary process; the effect of any particular bias is thus minimized”156. Mutual 
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competition within the field is strengthening particular positions and even allotting them 
biased entrenchment. 
How may one then say something of transition itself, of the top concept devising the 
particular cultural field of competition, such competition which then trickles down as 
actual policy? One way of seeing the issue is not dissecting time and space and 
linearizing both157, by objectivizing our object of study158 and by comprehending our 
approach in order to avoid the two. 
 
4.2 Role of Transition Theories 
Representing the Marxist counter-swing Derrida describes the dominant discourse and 
its incontestable self-evidence as a threefold conjuncture of political culture, media 
technology and scholarly culture. These together fight and squabble crisscrossing each 
other simply to together assert and produce hegemony159. For similar reasons 
Wallerstein persists on calling the World-systems analysis an analysis instead of a 
theory to separate it from the demarcations and reproductions of cleavages based on an 
ahistoricity of either conceptualization or processes. If are to believe Derrida the 
instrumental and constitutive role of transition theories would appear clear. Applied to 
Derrida’s theorizing, transition theories are used in line with modern media technology 
to reproduce political culture divided and defined by the scholarly assumptions on the 
nature of society in transition nations. Applied to Wallerstein they are used to justify 
either the refusal of existing cleavages or the creation of new ones enabling the 
exploitation of differing classes or groups through the means of production driven by 
the logic of a capitalist world-economy. 
As the neoliberal agenda of the 1980s had deregulated capital flows and eroded state 
financial regulatory power160 it functioned in the benefit of the described and argued 
instrumentalism of competing theories of transition. The Eastern European states 
embarked on free market liberalization determined by the natural laws modeled on 
western capitalist societies of the moment. The dismissal of the existing system then 
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caused the real values of social benefits to shrink to a fraction of earlier levels161, but 
nevertheless: 
Between 87-88 and 93-94 most post-communist countries increased cash social 
transfers.162 
The increased cash transfers did then little to counter the effects of inflation and 
devaluation of domestic currencies. These developments were then followed in the mid 
90s by the counter swing of socially based constructivist type transition theories. 
Social sector reforms have moved from the margins to the centre of the 
transformation agenda163 
These social sector reforms are then again implemented in a more utopian manner, with 
indifference to structural positions derived from the near and far past. For example Joan 
Nelson points out the lack of templates, the lack of institutions and moral perceptions as 
obstacles to social reforms and calls for a revitalization of state capacities, all of which 
are or could be actually easily traceable to socialist systems and found there. This serves 
as an example of how looking at the history of transition theories we are able to see the 
dialectical play of different approaches of social sciences. They are not simply molding 
transition societies but also through the disputes among themselves and the interaction 
between actual societies they are embedding the societies deeper into the global system, 
following Stephen Gill, coercively and discursively as they obtain control of systems of 
knowledge reproduction. 
The instrumental and constitutive role of transition must be traced through an 
interconnectedness of theory and society. The political economy of transition works in 
an instrumental way in strengthening and upholding cleavages of the modern world-
system164 and the coerciveness of the hegemony165 within it. 
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4.3 Historical Habitus 
Describing the destruction of the soviet socioeconomic system in 1992, Vladimir 
Kosmarskii recognizes three factors under which changes take place. Firstly, the 
demolition of once stable and habitual economic stereotypes, secondly alterations in the 
status of traditional social groups and change of structural appearance in respect new 
groups and thirdly disappearance of social values inculcated by the administrative 
system.166 Though Kosmarskii uses these structural developments to analyze possible 
attitudes towards transitional policies and to level a playing field, a ground zero upon 
which to begin, we may also attempt to deduct from them reasoning as to why so. Not 
dissecting the present from the past, but instead joining them together. 
Social attitudes towards governmental policies develop varied patterns. Whereas the 
soviet model mainly favored reactionary and anticipatory dispositions towards 
governmental action, the transitional model's enabling and at the same time coercive167 
policies are geared towards facilitating action and initiative based attitudes towards 
themselves. When such a clash occurs, it is clear that those marginalized experience 
inadequacies to form dispositions towards the new social divisions seek other means of 
sustenance. 
More generally, households survive by turning ‘inwards’ and expanding the 
activities of their ‘private’ sphere168 
The reactionary nature towards Soviet policy was forged throughout the political and 
policy changes of the late 60s and early 70s: A move from Khrushchev’s thaw to 
brezhnevian double morals. Under Khrushchev a new generation of soviet citizens 
entered office in relatively progressive times and enjoyed social mobility offered by 
access to the education system. The brezhnevian move of affirming their benefits in 
return for public acquiescence depended on reactionary survival strategies. This is 
described in Derluguian’s account of the moods in between trust networks and on the 
other hand of the resilient and adaptive navigating of the 60s trained nomenklatura 
during the Fall.169 
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Åberg and Sandberg connect responsiveness and social capital as commonly to be traits 
of democracies and therefore difficult to analyze in hegemonic and totalitarian regimes. 
But they continue that on the other hand the political system in soviet states was 
inclusive by force.170 Relating their criticism to the aspect of conceptualizing transition 
as a scientifically created and defined phenomenon, I ask whether responsiveness or 
disposition were simply reactionary and affirmative towards the state and therefore 
difficult to analyze by any means of social science bound by the conceptualization of 
the state and political mobilization as a universal form of action, derived from the core 
states. The applicability of traditional political science on the soviet state or semi-
peripheries in general may be questioned and at the same time I would be reluctant to 
question the formation of horizontal trust networks among actors, which in return 
facilitate specific habitus over time. A good example of such dispositions were most 
strongly present in the Central Asian soviet states, where division between public 
reactionary dispositions, that is behaving as expected in return for certain benefits, was 
heavily contrasted with private manifestations of religious and tribal dispositions, active 
and agent based. Yet, the importance of this divide is that these two personalities or 
habitues coexisted without contradiction, and were indeed considered the status quo. 
Statebuilding is then torn between soviet legacies of state functions and the intertwined 
impositions of a transnational economy. A clash between any unifying state policies and 
normative economic policies is sure to resonate in the class habitus. No positive policy 
program is possible and cleaveges such as ethnicity, nationality and linguistics serve ”to 
erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world”171. 
The state then seeks to take the anticipatory stance as we move from utopias to 
nomothetic derivation that is, based on what is rather than what can be. It seems clear 
that once a reactionary and anticipation based social habitus172 is subjected to rapid 
changes towards action and initiative based policies, what we would experience and in 
fact have experienced is a shift of survival strategies towards existing non-state 
networks rather than a complete voluntary construction of new non-monetary 
appropriation cultures on the cultural field. Again we find examples in Derluguian’s 
                                                 
170Åberg _ Sandberg: Social Capital and Democratization. Ashgate. Hants. England 2003, 99-101. 
171 Hobsbawm  1992, 169-177. 
172My usage of Bourdieu’s term is based on understandment that it suitedly describes dispositions of a 
non-deterministic nature. 
61 
 
description of intelligentsia-turn-rebel173 especially on the semi-peripheries and 
peripheries of the ex-developmental state, where these non-monetary networks were 
unable to compete against the newly introduced global finances174. The same 
development is described by Hobsbawm as a move from an ideological battle of 
revolution and counter-revolution to state power intertwined with transnational 
economies and intervened by non-nationalist outside powers. Yet, at the same time the 
social revolutionaries of the systemic changes have been committed to national 
autonomy175.  But, partly in the strongest loci of the semi-peripheries and peripheries 
and the core of the ex-state networks, some actors were able to abuse the conflagration 
of old trust networks, so to say dive in to the flames to hoard what was left unguarded, 
the strongest of this were the party-functionaries-turn-millionaires, red oligarchs. 
The coerciveness of the new policies demands initiatives in order to survive as 
passiveness is rewarded through marginalization. When an anticipatory habitus is faced 
with such expectations and is unable to survive through existing non-state trust 
networks, as mentioned above, the only remaining option is to find or build new 
survival strategies or engage in resistance. The problem here is that the previous state 
networks were a form of resistance themselves against the now dominant interaction 
channels, against market capitalism. Thus new expressions of resistance seek their 
legitimacy somewhere else, with nationalism and religion being the prime examples, or 
in more everyday behavior, engaging in locality level practices to escape discursive 
demands: 
…building complicated structures and networks for subsistence production 
within and around the household.176 
This duality of systemic coercion and action demanding structures is evident in the ever 
growing “lumpenproletariat” or, as called by Derluguian, sub-proletariat class of the 
world-system. The structurality of it was buoyantly demonstrated in the ‘89-‘91 
upheavals of now ex-socialist states, where the sub-proletariat formerly residing and 
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acting in the socialist structures was both semi-successful and certainly visible in its 
actions177during a time of world-systemic changes dramatically reflected on localities. 
Habitus is thus at the basis of strategies of reproduction that tend to maintain 
separations, distances, and relations of order(ing), hence concurring in practice 
(although not consciously or deliberately) in reproducing the system of 
differences constitutive of the social order.178 
In simple terms, with historical habitus here I refer to the observation that each 
perceived and also strictly analytical causal account refers to a set of preferences179, 
which are historical and spatial. This simple logic, then becomes complexional in a 
clash of normative liberalization and historical dispositions of the post-socialist space. 
On the surface this is evident in the changing role of post-socialist nationalisms, where 
nation-building is no longer a global political program, as put by Hobsbawm, but rather 
a catalyst for other developments180.  
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5. Roots of the Philosophy of Transitology 
Following the outlining of the form of transitology as a cultural field and the form’s 
relations to the historical social space of post-socialist countries in general, observations 
are made of the form of relations the cultural field has to social sciences and to the 
philosophy of social sciences. The observations rely heavily on philosophy of utopias as 
it is at the heart of the dialectical differences seen between the Marxist and positivist 
traditions within social sciences. This is followed by a short narrative on longer term 
developments that affected the philosophical outcome. 
What is the connection we are creating here? As George Kateb writes of utopia and its 
enemies, we need to realize both that means may defeat ends and, in reference to the 
Third Way, that there exist a gap between a humane welfare state and a society in which 
modern utopianism is attained.  He continues to assert that in “a period of transition” 
control over society is in the hands of those who made the revolution. 181 Who held 
transitional control? What is the connection between transitology and the renunciation 
of utopian thought?  
According to Kari Palonen the political problems of the topos are in general connected 
to a search for the possible and to a judgment between the possibilities182. This then 
boils down to the often time consuming process of judging the relations between 
possibilitites. The tools, institutions and socialization for this process are contested, they 
precipitate the efficiency yet also utopic extent of the topos. In cases they may just as 
well define and restrict and sometimes do so to the extent that Weber saw the possiblity 
of these instrumentalizations to form a stahlhartes gehäuse, which is a historical 
construct rationalizing and instrumentalizing our utopic topos. This was also the binding 
force in the alliance of socialism and utopian thought. Dahrendorf calls it the notion of 
system creeping into socialism and with this mix socialism took ground in societies 
embarking late on the path of modernization183. It served as an artificial stahlhartes 
gehäuse easily imposable there where the professionalization and democratization of 
politics had not happened as it had according to Kari Palonen184 in 19th century Europe. 
As Dahrendorf would surely agree, it was a self-imposed limitation of freedom on a 
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habitus of conditions of existence that was not yet penetrated by politics as an 
independently existing concept. Therefore the idea of utopia surfaces as an important 
concept when looking at the state of affairs after this system collapsed. 
Returning to Palonen it is important to mention his notion of the temporal implications 
of the topos of the possible and the topos of the situation to be largely a matter of 
taste185. This is where the connection of the historical habitus of a class of conditions of 
existence comes into play with transitology as a bourdeuinian cultural field, a 
distinction of taste. 
 
5.1 Renunciation of Utopia, Dissection of Time and Space 
Reason is in its very essence contradiction [sic], opposition, negation, as long as 
freedom is not yet real. if the contradictory, oppositional, negative, power of 
Reason is broken, reality moves under its own positive law, and, unhampered by 
the Spirit, unfolds its repressive force.186 
The past is not merely what has happened, but a very real and concrete paradox, it is 
future in the past187. Through past we define the limits of the future188. In this definition 
we are bound by our concepts as the means of perceiving and therefore controlling the 
past. 
The very first economic theories applied in the creation of the transition were the 
neoclassical ones. Neoclassical textbook theories in their purity lack both spatial and 
temporal dimensions.189 As the evolution of transition took hold after the ever so fitting 
application of non-spatial and non-temporal neoclassicism on the assumed tabula rasa of 
post-socialism, we find new theories of economics moving to stake their ground. These 
theories introduce in varying ways spatial and temporal qualities190 and in such began 
the dissection of transition societies on a theoretical level. 
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The concept of transition is particularly powerful as it folds space over time. It sets 
spatial differences on a universal time-axis or chronology.  With this I refer to the 
“geography of imagination” described by Doreen Massey191, which refers to an act of 
justification through manipulation of the relation of time and space. It is applied as a 
method of social control through the separation of the past and present192. In the case of 
transition, it is the division of time to create the space of the transition societies. By this 
distinction it is made possible to separately dissect the time before transition, derive 
from it a status, a beginning, after which the manipulation of space may be taken under 
observation. The effect has then also been continued or looped through a new derivation 
of time after this zero state, through an observation of space and form created upon the 
zero-state. With the latter I refer to the forming of transitology after transition itself. 
As Massey points out, such is the geography of power and knowledge.  And in such, it 
ignores structural imbalances and the very cleavages upon which it itself rests193. 
Therefore, in order to outline the form and formation of transitology in one sense, the 
application of world-systems analysis may prove helpful as it attempts to bridge 
differentiating histories in relation to each other through spatial structures. Not by 
universal structures set in space but by structures of social space itself. 
For transition the nature of utopia is vehemently important.  Imagination and images 
create something that is described and set forth, something more than an intention, 
something perceived and that something is the utopic topos of human beings194. And, as 
Bloch puts it, the problem here lies in the relation of our utopic topos and the real 
existing circumstances. Transition distorts this relation by linearly slicing time and 
implementing spatial perception, policies, aimed at achievements already attained at 
another time: 
In a closed and complete[d] world every utopia is homeless.195 
Therefore, a direct consequence of such action is the irrationality of policy in relation to 
the rationalizations of individuals, or vice versa depending on the view point, and 
displayed most clearly in the beginning of the undertaken transition policies. The idea of 
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a future that has not happened is in itself possible only in an open and unfinished world 
that has a horizon exceeding itself196. Transition implicates a closed process of 
transformation to an already known form where all conflicts derive merely from the 
implementation of the transformation and not of the rationalization of forms of action 
fulfilling utopia. Someone might point out that democracy and capitalism are utopian 
goals themselves. In fact they are forms of action with the perceived utopian goals of 
material or social welfare or freedom and as such not applicable utopian goals to 
stimulate and formulate rationalizations of action. 
Whether the results achieved through such policies are good or bad, desired or 
undesired, is not my line of argument. Policies under transition as described from this 
perspective enable conceptual competition and the creation of conflicts without 
subjugating the oppositional positions themselves to change. Theoretical positions not 
aimed at rationalizations of action fulfilling utopia are not subject to rationalization 
themselves as they themselves, forgive the tautology, strive to rationalize action: An 
essential part of actual, true future, the actual what-is-to-come, is the new, the 
undiscovered197.   
Transition as a concept seems from this point of view to create a situation in which an 
ideographically perceived phenomenon is attempted to police nomothetically.  Such a 
condition was achieved on the theoretical level as described earlier in this chapter and 
on the policy level in wake of the authority vacuum following the Fall. The myths of 
democracy and capitalism were mobilized to depoliticize the existential response that 
followed198.  As such this would not have withstood but required both the rhetoric and 
social science of transition to constrain legitimization of the right to define myths. This 
was demonstrated very visibly already at start through the rejection of the Third Way 
model199 from all directions of the competing positions200. Even though any Third Way 
model might not confer with socialist utopias201, it serves to highlight the polarized state 
from which utopian intention vanished with the delegitimization of the antihegemonic 
other. 
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A social rubric lacking utopian intention is arguably incapable of autonomous and 
inherent social transformation202 and rather tearing itself apart in the face of any 
discursive claims on the possibilities and horizon of social action. Similarly to the 
manner in which any ecosystem will fall upon a chain reaction of breaking linkages and 
niches when change is introduced only from the outside rather than through expansion 
and complexification. When such a development occurs - as with the famous case of 
rabbits brought to the Australian continent - either a partial collapse or continued and 
expanded normative and discursive policing of the system are the likely scenarios. The 
latter more often than not is prone to lead to panopticism203 as means of increased 
predictability as the contagion spreads. 
One of the key strategies of social control is to divorce the present from the past 
and to display it as timeless and eternal.204 
 
5.2 A Road Paved for Transition 
How then such a seemingly violent hijacking of political will and societal horizons was 
possible? Roots of the conceptualization of transition need to be drawn at least to the 
world revolution205 of 1968. 1968 was a revolution against the corruption and 
connivance of the Old Left. Behind the Iron Curtain these antisystemic movements were 
forcefully repressed. An act which then allowed Brezhnev’s rise to power by 
conforming the autonomic authority and power of regional party functionaries and 
nomenclature in exchange for them restraining and dampening any antisystemic 
movements206, whereas in Western Europe such cleavages were dealt with major 
restructurings207. 
The business of 1968 thus remained unfinished. It had to be completed, and so it 
would be in 1989.208 
The process is closely linked to what Alain Touraine has describes as the superseding of 
work by knowledge formation209.  Recognition of this failed to actualize itself in the 
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soviet states as it did in Western Europe with the restructurings mentioned by Arrighi, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein. Only partly may we notice these restructurings in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland210.  The political power and significance of work and the 
workplace as the action rationalizing the means to achieve utopias, as the tool of the 
human utopic topos, faded.  A concrete example of this is the old story of the backward 
state of information technology in the soviet states, which actually was not the case. The 
technology was readily available and in use in high research and science facilities. But 
unlike the part played by machinery during the modernizations of the 30s and 50s, the 
usage of technology as a politically transformative tool had no function in socialist 
states and therefore held no potential. At the same time the creation of a new class of 
information workers in core capitalist countries in the wake of the restructurings was 
ongoing and most speedy in France211. There, for example, the Minitel service launched 
in 1982 quickly gained providence, as the stage was already set. Indeed the 
restructurings in the West were mistaken by Brezhnev as an apparent weakness and thus 
gave no impetus for modifying their strategy212. And coming to the 80s it backlashed.   
 The absence of politically transformative work then proved most crucial once 
Gorbachev began his reforms. It was the cultural intelligentsia suppressed after 1968 
that more often than not then seized the day213. Transformative action expands the scope 
of possible action214, or as Bloch put it, exceeds the horizon. By doing this it does not 
restrain historicity into such social relations which on the constrast conformative action 
requires for its legitimization. Therefore the scientific playground was set for transition 
to emerge as an uncontested concept for policy formulations. A radical rejection of all 
antisystemic ideologies in favor of the least plausible of prosystemic ideologies 
followed, a monetarist economization followed215. 
In relation to social sciences specifically, it was stated as one of the results of a 1994 
Berlin Conference on Social Sciences in Transition that the state of social sciences in 
Eastern Europe corresponded then to that of the West in the ‘60s. This situation in the 
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West led to an institutionalization and standardization of if information, methods and 
data.216 
Thus coming to the mid and late 90s “transition” found itself in a situation described 
well in 1994 by the Polish professor Edmund Mokrzycki: “The ideological landscape is 
not only changing rapidly; it seems to have lost all recognizable landmarks.”217 
Only a society historicized prevalently enough is able to define its own normative 
guidelines in contrast to having them passed down by any entity transcending the 
society218. Thus, we see the importance of discontinuation of time by transition to inflict 
its own normative call for action upon means.  The sadness lies in the relation of society 
and policy. Utopian thought is essential in bringing forth social and cultural 
transformation219. With discursive state action such possibility was deprived in an 
analogous manner to that of 1917. Therefore, when the state moved from the 
predominance of the state and of social evolution to that of social forces and national 
problems220, the reactionary habitus of the evolutionist, functionalist soviet citizen had 
but slight remedies against the discursive nomotheticity of transition. 
 
5.3 Dialectical Roots of Transition 
In 1863 Nikolay Chernyshevsky published his novel What Is to Be Done? having 
completed it imprisoned at the fortress of St. Peter and Paul. In his novel 
Chernyshevsky envisions the new man, a rational yet egoistic being.  The book 
accidentally passed censorship and was published the same year.221 Besides greatly 
influencing Lenin, who named his famous pamphlet after the novel, it most importantly 
empowered educated young Russians and gave fuel for the creation of a new social 
class, whose habitus was geared towards a new type of cultural competition, never to be 
institutionalized.  
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In his pamphlet Lenin denies the possibility of any alternate interpretations of socialism 
and most specifically any Third Way possibility or ideology: 
For mankind has not developed any “third” ideology, and in a society torn by 
class conflict no ideology transcending the classes can exist.222 
Though crediting instinctual action with offering us beginnings, Lenin accuses it and the 
instinctual formation of the proletariat of inefficacy and goes on demanding disciplined, 
pure and scientifically organized revolutionary action, policed from above. 
My analogy here is between the young cultural intelligentsia that came to being during 
the Khrushchev era and was repressed then again during Brezhnev in favor of the 
entrenched functionaries. The castless intelligentsia denied of its habitus until 
Gorbachev, but then again marginalized in the wake of monetarization and 
liberalization. The vested interests of the nomenclature, solidified in developmental 
states by the structural ability of bureaucracy to subvert central command223, are 
contradictory to any restructurings where a meritocratic understanding between state 
power, cultural contest and household survival would come together. In such a situation 
the refusal of any Third Way, may indeed appear rational, as alternative forms of 
legitimization and survival strategies would easily subdue consensus, as demonstrated 
in Derluguian’s world-systems biography by the actions of Musa Shanibov, a freedom 
fighter changing his ideology from universal humanism to religious nationalism224 . 
In 1990 most prominently Jeffrey Sachs in his article What Is to Be Done? proclaimed 
that the eastern countries must reject any lingering ideas about a “third way”. He 
argues that reforms are a seamless web, only applicable as a whole225. The slightly 
naïve analogy to Lenin’s insistence on pure socialism comes to mind inevitably. Thus 
we notice an inability of middle class meritocratic, might I even propose nationalist, 
cadres to anchor themselves to power by overcoming structural cleavages and rather 
observe the victory of “world-systemic arbitrageurs”. 
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5.4 Legacy of Social Science Socialism 
Most legitimate cultural goods are consumed on a seller’s market226. Such was the 
market after the delegitimization of accepted soviet nomenklatura controlled culture. In 
this regard it is no wonder, that it was the voices of educated, yet oppressed soviet 
citizens that were heard. And that such a form of transitology uncontested took root. 
Following Bourdieu in constructing the objective class upon which transition was 
destined, we ask ourselves what might have been the properties embodied as their class 
habitus?227 The simple answer would appear to be the search for a narrative. But this 
seems too hindsighted. They have a narrative to share. The true denominators of a class 
habitus - I prefer to refer to a class of conditions of existence rather than one of agents - 
are the hidden subsidiary characteristics. These secondary properties, such as sex or 
ethnicity, are according to Bordieu always present as principles of selection or 
exclusion228. The more dispersed the modal trajectories of a class are the less are 
practices reducible to the effect of synchronically defined position. This is interesting in 
respect to the dispersed nature of subsidiary properties of class habitus in the post-
socialist states. Therefore it would seem surprising if a concerted class habitus would 
rise from the post-socialist space and even more so if we are to add the factor of 
discursive capitalist agency and structures. The construction of institutionalized habitus 
towards vertical societal action would then seem much more unlikely than a stronger 
marginalization and reconfiguration of horizontal networks. 
According to Bourdieu there exists a strong correlation between social positions and the 
dispositions of the agents who occupy them.  When faced with social decline a 
reconversion of strategies is required to escape the collective decline of the class. 
Failing in such a reconversion inclines towards divergent stances in, say, religion or 
politics. Such an effect blurs the relationship between social class and religious or 
political opinions.229 This leaves further space for any superimposed rationalizations. 
The nature and form of socialist social science had a historical impact in constituting 
this cleavage.  
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Claiming that transitology fairly uncontested occupied the cultural field of social 
science and policy formulation in the post-socialist space we must outline the legacy 
that socialist social science had inserted upon it. I do not examine cultural 
legitimization, but look at the strict process of scientific labour. Keeping in mind we 
consider academic work a social process influenced by the instruments the academic 
labourer utilizes. 
This process then constituted a particular habitus towards reproduction of academic 
work. Both Dahrendorf and Durkheim define socialism a system of thought230, which 
through time emphasizes dispositional action in a social process. This relation was no 
doubt distorted through the decades of real socialism.  
Socialism is future oriented. In Durkheim’s words “a plan for the reconstruction of 
present-day societies”. As such it is more so a representation of the social state of its 
time than a science, a social fact and an expression of new social dispositions. 231 The 
canvas upon which social inquiry was painted had scant importance in relation to the 
readied painting. This instigated a connection between the culture field and policy 
formation as it could serve as means to achieve perceived goals rather than the end 
result of addressable processes. Because of the nature of the post-modern challenge it 
becomes implicit to claim, that this state was continued as a constitutive factor 
maintaining the system of thought itself and thus became entrenched as a mode of 
conditioning, as a disposition in itself. 
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6. Synthesis: The Conjuncture of Transitology 
Transitology is not an ideal or objective tool for analyzing post-socialist change, but 
rather born out of it. It is naturally subject to scientific objectivations itself, guided and 
molded by its own path-dependencies. A scientific field is constituted by its historical 
and social conditions of production232 and the history of transitology is very rapid and 
exponential and at the same the social conditioning of production within transitology 
has come to pass in a very laissez-faire manner, conditioned mainly from outside the 
scientific field in promotion of each particular established faculty of social science and 
not conditioned at all bottom-up by its subject matter, nor contested by an antisystemic 
approach stemming from the transitional societies themselves. 
The ideologically and antisystemically implosive nature of the fall of communism in 
Eurasia created a certain cultural space, which was and is defined by structurally and 
historically dialectical roots on the other hand and the contingent situation between the 
processes within social sciences and the political space of the post-socialist countries on 
the other. 
This originally stimulated the constitution of transitology, stemming from earlier studies 
on democratic transitions, with certain features: Normativiness towards policy 
measures, nomotheticity and reliance on simple universalistic causal links, a fast inner 
flux of entrenchments and positions and yet an uncontested outer sphere 
To foist positivist models onto the study of human beings and to search for the 
invariable laws governing human behavior and social change is to distort the 
dynamic, contingent, mutable, and indeterminate character of social action.233 
In our terms of a system transitology first proceeded as a chain reaction instigated by 
multiple changes on multiple levels. The ‘outburst’ then began to bifurcate; it 
dispersed as it clashed with the political and societal post-socialist space. The 
synthesis of this clash is our main argument and conclusion. The clash entrenched 
and to an extent widened the cleavage that is the incommensurability of post-
socialist space and transitological social scientific thought. Transitology 
consolidated itself upon or around this cleavage. 
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6.1 Out of Systemic Thought 
Our largest hurdle to conclude anything of the nature and evolution of transitology as 
we have now excavated it lies in the very same history from where the defining 
characteristics of transitology stem from. These knowledge structures emerge from 19th 
and 20th century institutionalizations and instrumentalizations of social sciences. The 
economists formulate universalistic quantifiable equations, the political scientists 
meddle with simplified mid-range causalities and deductive-nomological explanations 
and too often the historians concentrate on long-term trends, ideas and eras or particular 
isolated events within them. At the same time the realities of political thought and action 
are torn by the legacies of the “binary lenses of modernity” as Georgi Derluguian calls 
them.234 Yet the tools we have to employ are constituted by the same knowledge 
structures. 
Thus our instruments are not directly applicable to draw any direct conclusions from. 
Instead we should try to observe the oscillations and reactions present when we contrast 
these differing yet dialectical views. Doing this we are reminded by Bourdieu, that to 
avoid historical and social determinisms we must develop a habitus with the constitutive 
disposition to act, as Bourdieu says it, a priori on the modus operandi, instead of ex post 
on the opus operatum.235 How to understand this in terms of this study on transitology? 
The general answer given to us by Wallerstein is the unthinking of the 19th century 
paradigm, the antinomies of structure and agency, micro and macro, nomothetic and 
idiographic.236 
Georgi Derluguian gives us a more specific answer regarding the post-socialist space. 
The ambiguous state of the post-socialist cultural field should be operationalized with 
the concepts of social capital, habitus and trajectory.  Secondly we may use Bourdeau’s 
concept of class to map social transformations at individual and aggregate level. This 
includes new trajectories of different classes under social transformations, new 
expression of legitimizing cultural hierarchies and capital in the reformed social space 
and the new elements of political mobilizations. In the following chapter 6.2 I will give 
my conclusion of the interaction of these elements. 
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What do these three notions mean to the researcher? We must acknowledge the social 
act in the social process of knowledge formation. Secondly, we must not simply 
acknowledge but escape notions of functionality or applicability of our own work, or we 
inevitably join a system of thought so loathed by Dahrendorf. 
In light of these observations we may conclude of transitology that first of all, its 
uniqueness lies not in the novelty of the fall of communism or in its goal- and policy-
oriented normativeness, but in its specific dislodgment from the prevalent wider 
systems of thought, emulating an inner contradictory logic. The instruments and 
institutions of panopticism and discursiveness, of evaluating between possibilities were 
unaccountable and unsanctioned. The result was an exaggerated reaction: Deducing 
from the prevalent market orthodoxy an over appreciation of bureaucratic - policy 
relevant – knowledge followed237. Yet, when observing the history of social sciences 
Peter Wagner reminds us that one aspect of the widely extended modern institutions is 
trust, but its flipside is dependence and discplination, thus the spread of abstract systems 
of thought is by necessity an immense collectivization process, where people had to 
learn to behave predictably, as orderly organized masses before the benefits of social 
planning could be reaped238. In itself this process is enabling but only so under the strict 
precondition of following disciplined lines of behavior, as we discussed in chapter 4.3 to 
be the state of discord between the historical habitus of the class of conditions of 
existence in the post-socialist Eurasia in relation to policy and theory. Importantly, when 
looking at this process in relation to the history of transitology we must remember to 
connect to it the roots of ‘89/’91 as a continuation of ‘68. Connect it to the failure of the 
brezhnevites to incorporate antisystemic forces into the political apparatus. This 
cleavage then aggravated with transitology as the catalyst. 
...the only truth is that truth is a stake in struggles as much within the scientific 
world (the sociological field) as in the social world that this scientific world 
takes as its object...239 
 
 
                                                 
237 Derluguian 2005, 310-311. 
238 Wagner 2001a, 83. 
239Bourdieu 2004, 115. 
76 
 
6.2 Oedipal Transitology 
Whenever objective structures encounter mental structures that are in line with them 
they produce complicity where the imminent tendencies of the established order 
continuously appear as expected. Similarly Marx described the dominant dominated by 
their domination. Agents in the university world more often than not conform to this 
analysis.240 
 The weight load of the type of social scientific thought transitology introduced was not 
simply too heavy, so that under the conditions of a dismantled cultural field a 
reformation of dispositions had no structural starting point to relate to, but indeed it was 
also too weak; too weak in relation to the whole of social scientific competition and 
legitimating structures. It is an Oedipus syndrome in the sense that transitology failed to 
recognize its own constituting cleavages and antinomies, its own history, but yet 
remained blindly devoted to those aspects of its past that most predominantly gave birth 
to it and used them in order to establish its own standing, to entrench itself in a similar 
manner as for example Joseph Stiglitz and the polish Trio did. 
On the levels of policy and the political topos, as the fall of the socialist system in 
‘89/’91 was a continuation of 1968, it was a continuation of an antisystemic movement 
and instead of incorporating any of this cleavage into existing forms of knowledge 
formation, the cleavage itself has been consolidated and entrenched in the wake of 
transitology as well as in the wake of the weakness of transitology to separate from its 
origins.  
In this light it is unsurprising to stumble upon so many political transitologists meddling 
with various theories of elite bargaining, rent-seeking, state-capture and cronyism. It 
would do good to review these theories in light of capitalist competition in the historical 
world-system in relation to class distinction in the post-socialist space and its state of 
discord with the introduced cultural field. Why so? In this situation we end up with 
inflation of any cultural capital, thus delegitimizing also social, cultural and even 
economic capital acquired historically from the space of the represented class of 
conditions of existence (in the post-socialist space). This devaluates any predictability 
of the historical habitus and nullifies any efforts to construct an indigenous system for 
evaluating possibilities of the utopian topos, a system for inclusive concerted action. We 
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are then left only and simply with the discursiveness and disciplinary demands of the 
implemented system of thought, of the foreign unconnected stahlhartes gehause.  
On the level of politics we then lack any constrained professionalization which Kari 
Palonen refers to have happened in 19th and 20th century Europe. Remember, the 
temporal extend of the topos of the possible is defined by distinction in the topos of the 
situation241. How is this relation then to function in instrumentalizing and rationalizing 
the topos of the possible by the policy makers and candidates for professionalized-
politicians-to-be when we remember how the oedipal cultural field of transitology 
prides and lives off of its dissections of space and time, as discussed in chapter 5.1? 
These tautologies are the core of the dependent relation between the historically 
established, rationalized and institutionalized social sciences and the semi-peripheral 
manifestations of the post-socialist space. The tautologies reproduce the cleavages of 
western social sciences in the post-socialist space, not to mitigate the atomization of the 
cultural field but to prevent it. In the post-socialist space those cleavages are not the 
ones around which the relation of the political topos and the social scientific cultural 
field would have historically grown. 
New groupings with their aspirations for monopoly on ideas and institutions took 
the lead.242 
 
6.3 What Is to Be Done? 
How to rekindle the imagination of the historical habitués of post-socialist space and the 
oedipally dysfunctional cultural field? Let me lastly wonder off of theoretical synthesis 
and from my point of view weigh what might we learn from my research construct. 
Aware of what we have concluded how should we now approach the post-socialist 
condition? 
The answers provided to us by authors like Meghnad Desai and Peter Wagner follow an 
apologetic and nostalgic argument. They begin from the fact that society still exists, 
therefore why not a new system of antisystemic thought would rise from the ashes of 
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the socialist Phoenix. Thus, Wagner, states that there is no reason to assume that 
collective guidance would not still be needed, unless we wish to return to the idea that 
the interaction of a multitude of individuals would automatically provide positive 
collective results243. Meghnad Desai has fate that utopian thought will once again 
manifest itself, but on a larger, perhaps global scale. 
Ralf Dahrendorf described in 1990 the road to freedom to consist of three processes. 
The constitutional aspect must demonopolize political power, a regulatory market 
economy must aim for free markets yet constrained through politics based on some 
doctrines of thought producing competing cultural distinctions. Thirdly and most 
importantly for Dahrendorf comes the civil society to pull the divergent time scales of 
politic and economic reform together, “the hour of the citizen”. Civil society must have 
substantial variety and power outside of the state.244 These three aspects Dahrendorf 
argues must work and emerge together and with time in Eastern Europe, for a free 
society to emerge. He feels the prospects are gloomy. 
Wallerstein has long insisted that the ever entrenching and widening cleavages of the 
inner logic of the capitalist world-economy will not seize until the bifurcation of the 
system brings itself down, what is to follow he does not know. In this sense we have not 
much left to do expect to wait, survive and perhaps further this development, so that at 
that moment one desiring to do so could seize the day. 
Not wandering off too far to predictions of the collapse of capitalism or the slow 
evolutionary creation of a free society, what is to be done? I was recently on an OSCE 
election observation assignment in Kyrgyzstan. With the guidance of yes-or-no 
questions provided to me I was to help the organization determine the level of 
democracy of the elections. My interpreter was a 29-year-old Kyrgyz man and a father 
of one called Kamal. He held a PhD in economics with an immense knowledge of 
transition economics and taught at local universities when not moonlighting as an 
interpreter. Driving by a picturesque mountain river Kamal lamented of the condition of 
a hot springs facility we saw. Before it was visited by the likes of Yuri Gagarin, he told 
me. It is in ruins now because the Kyrgyz have been unable to attract foreign direct 
investment, he continued. Kamal outranked me in education, life’s experience and the 
number of languages spoken. Yet, I enjoyed respect from his part, not simply because I 
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was his employer for the time being, but because he knew that I hold future prospects 
outranking his by far, if not in quality then in quantity. The post-socialist space is lodged 
as described in this paper. Its defining character has become the constituting cleavage of 
its functioning. Even though the notion of a self-constituting system always offers the 
possibility for change, in this contingency, which has become a structural cleavage of 
the wider system, any rapid change stemming from local (re-)politicization and 
instrumental rationalization appears unlikely. 
Nothing is really to be done in that regard. In the words of a teacher of mine, professor 
of East European sociology at Freie Universität Berlin, Nikolai Genov: 
Thus the Eastern Europeans are confronted with a rather complex problem 
situation in which the steps in the direction of social rationalization meet various 
modifications of irrationality.245 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The multiple tautologies of transitology reproduce themselves in connection with 
differing dissections of time and space. The tautologies may be divided tentatively to 
three groupings which intertwine in various ways on various levels: 
1) The nomothetic tautologies dismaying continuities and historical structures 
2) The realist and evolutionist tautologies dismaying spatial dimensions and the 
character of a global undividable unit of analysis 
3) The unobjectivated research indifferent of the aforementioned spatial or temporal 
character of their own research setting, its concepts, history and relation to the subject. 
In 1994 a conference in Berlin on the changing state of social sciences amidst the 
transition in Europe was held. Eastern European participants of the conference showed 
reluctance to an unquestioned application of Western theories and methods. Such basic 
concepts as political ‘left’and political ‘right’ bore differing meanings in different 
regions.  
A commercialization of research in the wake of ‘89 was mentioned as one of the reasons 
driving research isolation and lack of overview in the post-socialist space. Data was at 
the time often passed only to the West.246 It is clear that such actions served only 
purposes of scientific competition within the established western community. 
Organizers of the conference Heinrich Best and Ulrike Becker write in the concluding 
volume that “The Conference has shown that the Eastern European infrastructure is 
unable to counteract this research-inhibiting process”. They continue to state that 
competition on the scientific arena of Eastern European social scientists is made 
impossible due to a scarcity of information flow. 247  
Such developments stemming from the situation described in this thesis left the post-
socialist cultural field of social sciences vulnerable to exploitation and predatory 
attacks. It resulted in a forceful adaptation of established perspectives supported by 
strong financing and institutions. Ironically the fate of the Eastern European social 
scientist followed the same pattern as that of the collective worker described by Allina-
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Pissano. An embarkation on competitive dispositions imitating western habitus was 
coupled with a choice to quietly marginalize.  
This meant in any case competition against other local actors for foreign or international 
gains. Therefore the means did not and do not legitimize the ends. This effectively leads 
to a situation in which this delegitimate competition is upheld by its very existence. The 
reward is a raise to peerage, the ennobling of the social scientist after which he no 
longer needs to compete with his local peers, with the other roundheads, in a 
delegitimate situation and may join the academic jet set surfing the western 
establishments of Berlin, Florence, London and the States. This process is even 
facilitates through multiple outposts established after the Fall by such financiers as the 
George Soros Foundation. They provide extraction pipelines for brain-drain, namely the 
many new universities of the post-socialist space boasting the title “American” or 
“European”. 
 
 
The internationalization of social science research is only at its beginning.248 
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